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ABSTRACT 
 
BRINGING THEM TOGETHER: 
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS  
AND  
TURKISH DEMOCRACY, 1945-1950 
 
 
Kayaoğlu, Barın 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
May 2005 
At certain times, the U.S. has been a complementary player in helping 
different countries to democratize without interfering in the affairs of the host 
country. During the Cold War, this policy owed to Washington’s anti-Communist 
disposition. Most of the time, anti-Communism, freedom, and democracy were used 
interchangeably. 
This thesis talks about such a case where the U.S. kept a close eye on the 
transition to democracy, namely Turkey from 1945 until 1950. 
Primary U.S. policy towards Turkey at the onset of the Cold War was to keep 
the Soviet Union out. Meanwhile, Turkish leaders’ democratic credentials, 
particularly those of Atatürk and İnönü, were the triggering factors for 
democratization. Treating the two traditionally separate phenomena, however, needs 
to be reconsidered. 
The thesis will look at the historical record to analyze how Turkish 
democratization was a factor in the relations between the U.S. and Turkey at the 
beginning of the Cold War. Contrary to expectations, the U.S. did not exert pressure 
on Turkey to democratize as Turkey moved steadily on that path. 
Also interestingly, Turkish statesmen and intellectuals saw democracy and 
the U.S. partnership as the manifestation of their modernization and Westernization. 
This point offers itself as another building block for the thesis. 
 
Keywords: Democracy, democratization, Turkish-American Relations, Cold War. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
BİR ARAYA GETİRMEK: 
TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ VE TÜRK DEMOKRASİSİ, 1945-1950 
 
 
Kayaoğlu, Barın 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
Mayıs 2005 
Muhtelif zamanlarda, değişik ülkelerin içişlerine karışmadan 
demokratikleşmelerinde yardımcı olmak için ABD tamamlayıcı bir oyuncu işlevi 
görmüştür. Soğuk Savaş sırasında, bu politika özellikle Washington’un anti-
Komünist eğilimine bağlıydı. Çoğu zaman, anti-Komünizm, özgürlük ve demokrasi 
eşanlamlı olarak kullanılıyordu. 
Bu tez ABD’nin demokrasiye geçişi yakından izlediği böyle bir durumdan 
bahsetmektedir, yani 1945 ve 1950 yılları arasında Türkiye. 
Soğuk Savaş’ın başlangıcında ABD’nin Türkiye’ye yönelik birincil politikası 
Sovyetler Birliği’ni dışarıda tutmaktı. Diğer yandan, Türk liderlerinin, özellikle 
Atatürk’ün ve İnönü’nün, demokrasiye bağlılıkları demokratikleşmeyi tetikleyen 
etkenlerdi. Yine de, bu olguları ayrı şekilde ele alma geleneğinin gözden geçirilmesi 
gerekmektedir. 
Bu tez Türk demokratikleşmesinin Soğuk Savaş’ın başlangıcında Türkiye ile 
ABD arasındaki ilişkilere etkisini incelemek için tarihsel kayıtlara bakacaktır. 
Beklentilerin aksine, ABD Türkiye’ye demokratikleşmesi için baskı uygulamamıştır 
zira Türkiye zaten bu yolda ilerlemekteydi. 
Ayrıca ilginçtir ki Türk devlet adamları ve aydınları demokrasiyi ve 
Amerikan ortaklığını çağdaşlaşmalarının ve Batılılaşmalarının bir ilanı olarak 
görmekteydiler. Bu nokta da bu tezin yapı taşlarından biridir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi, demokratikleşme, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Soğuk 
Savaş. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the first time since post-World War II Germany and Japan, the United 
States has taken direct action to create democracies. For better or worse, the U.S. is 
directly involved in Iraq and Afghanistan for that purpose. In the past, the U.S. has 
been a complementary player in helping different countries to democratize. That is, 
the U.S. did not interfere with the affairs of the host country directly, but showed an 
interest in that country’s aim to democratize. 
This thesis talks about such a case where the U.S. kept a close eye on the 
transition to democracy, namely Turkey from 1945 until 1950. Several problems 
have led to the creation of this thesis. First of all, Turkish-American relations and 
Turkish democratization are still treated separately. Students of Turkish-American 
relations and Turkish democracy have shown only passing interest in looking at the 
connection between the two concepts.1 On the one hand, democratization has barely 
received any attention, and the association between the U.S. and Turkey has been 
mainly viewed as a strategic partnership. On the other hand, the transition to 
democracy had simply to do with Turkey’s internal politics. 
Both parties are right. The primary U.S. concern at the onset of the Cold War 
was to keep the Soviet Union out of Turkey, and Turkey was an indispensable asset 
                                                 
1 Indeed, they have done so in rare instances. Paul Henze, Turkish Democracy and the American 
Alliance (Santa Monica: RAND), 1993; Hakan Yılmaz, “Democratization from Above in Response to 
the International Context,” New Perspectives on Turkey 17, (1997): 1-38. 
 2 
in American strategic calculations against the Soviets.2 Meanwhile, Turkish leaders’ 
democratic credentials, particularly those of Atatürk and İnönü, were the triggering 
factors for democratization. The Turkish revolution, pushed through Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk’s reforms from 1923 until 1938 and carried on by his friend and successor 
İsmet İnönü, was the main reason for democratization.  
Nevertheless, treating the two phenomena separately has to be reconsidered 
now as the record presents an alternative. The U.S. was genuinely interested in 
Turkey’s democratization, but did not exert pressure on Turkey to that end. Turkey 
was already moving in that direction. The U.S. was observing the transition through 
its embassy in Ankara. With the Truman Doctrine, reference to Turkish democracy 
came to the forefront in the U.S. 
This thesis will be structured as such: First, Turkey’s republican ideology will 
be analyzed in order to appreciate its influence on Turkish democratization. Two 
schools of thought come to the forefront when one looks at the literature on 
Kemalism and Turkey’s republican experience. The first group argues that Kemalism 
was essentially an authoritarian regime. In leading scholar Feroz Ahmad’s words, the 
Turkish system after 1923 was based on a loose “alliance between the urban middle 
class and the intelligentsia, army officials, state officials, the landowners, and 
notables of Anatolia.”3 Turkey was run by a “monoparty,” the Republican People’s 
Party. “In this system it was not only the existence of a single party that was 
significant. More important was the absence of a separation between party and 
government: in fact, the party was the government.”4 Elections were held in the 
                                                 
2 Melvyn Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 
1945-1952,” The Journal of American History 71, No. 4. (Mar., 1985): 807-825. 
3 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst & Company, 
1977), 1-2. 
4 Ibid, 1. 
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country periodically, but only RPP candidates were allowed to run. The people never 
elected their representatives directly, but only the electoral colleges that decided the 
result. Furthermore, significant pressure was exerted on the press; indeed, some of it 
was semi-official. It was the existence of this authoritarian “monoparty” system that 
categorized pre-1950 Turkey as undemocratic. 
Another group studying Turkish politics argues that Kemalist ideology 
essentially aimed at building democracy in the country. Kemal Karpat argues that 
“the transition of Turkey’s one-party regime to a multi-party system was 
prepared...by the liberal concepts at the foundation of the Republic,” which finally 
became a reality through “the decision of the Republican Party government under the 
direct influence of İnönü.”5 In that regard, both Atatürk and İnönü qualify as 
democrats. 
In fact, transition to multi-party democracy was tried twice in Atatürk’s life. 
The time necessary for the reforms to consolidate and the harsh measures to maintain 
Turkish neutrality in World War II, however, precluded success. While the U.S. 
partnership was coming about after the war, so was democracy. There is no direct 
causality but still an interesting connection. At first Turkey’s democratization was 
not mentioned in U.S. government circles. But as the relations between the two 
countries improved, so did reference to each other’s democratic system. 
 Next, the thesis will look at the parallel evolution of Turkish democratization 
and Turkish-American relations from 1945 until 1950. Contrary to expectations, the 
U.S. did not exert pressure on Turkey to democratize. Turkey was already moving 
along that path. Nonetheless, there was a connection between Turkey and the U.S. 
                                                 
5 Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 137. 
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with respect to the latter’s efforts to democratize and the former’s commitment to 
halt Communism and promote “freedom” and “democracy.” 
To elaborate on this point, documents from the U.S. embassy in Ankara, 
reporting Turkey’s steps in democratization, will be used. The discernment of the 
embassy on Turkey’s political events from 1945 until 1949 is remarkable. What is 
further remarkable is how well the embassy reflected the events in Turkey without 
taking sides or passing judgements. One is curious why the information based on the 
embassy’s reports were not emphasized more often by the Truman administration in 
order to attract Congressional and popular support in the U.S. 
The thesis will also pay attention to how Turkish statesmen and intellectuals 
saw democracy and the U.S. partnership as the manifestation of their modernization 
and Westernization. There was continuous reference in Turkey to the “great 
American democracy” and how it was there to help Turkey resist “Communist 
expansion.”6 Meanwhile, the Americans were praising Turks for “the development of 
Western democracy in Turkey.”7 The Truman administration used the idea of anti-
Communism synonymously with “freedom” and “democracy” and the Trukish case 
attested to this point. 
The record posits an interesting connection between the U.S. and Turkey in 
the early years of the Cold War. On the one hand, the two countries were trying to 
increase their security. On the other hand, they also saw in each other the opportunity 
to foster their types of government. 
                                                 
6 Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson to the Secretary of State, telegram no. 195, “Istanbul press reactions 
March 14 to Truman speech,” Ankara, March 14, 1947, Records of the Department of State Relating 
to Internal Affairs of Turkey, 1945-1949 (Washington: National Archives, 1983), microfilm, roll 2. 
7 Counselor of the Embassy Herbert S. Bursley to the Secretary of State, dispatch no. 1819, “Peker 
Government Wins Vote of Confidence in Secret Caucus of People’s Party Assembly Group; Dissident 
Group within People’s Party,” Ankara, August 30, 1947, IAT, roll 4. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE PROBLEM:  
RETHINKING KEMALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND  
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will reconsider the relationship between Kemalism1 and 
democracy. It will be conceded that Kemalism was both an authoritarian and a 
liberal ideology. However, its ultimate objective was to establish a Western type of 
democracy in Turkey. This point must be borne in mind when looking at Turkish 
democratization from 1945 until 1950. Briefly treating the attempts to democratize 
from 1923 until 1945, the chapter will assess the authoritarian and liberal aspects of 
Kemalism. As Turkish democracy is paradoxically termed a “leader’s democracy,”2 
some emphasis shall also be placed on the ideas and policies of Atatürk and İnönü. 
Next, the chapter will delineate the historiography on the Cold War and 
Turkish-American relations. Here, strategic calculations play a dominant role. As 
argued in the introduction, primary U.S. concern during the Cold War was to keep 
the Soviet Union and Communism out of Turkey. These concerns will be examined 
in order to provide the context in which Turkish democracy and Turkish-American 
relations interacted. 
Finally, the chapter will look at the two studies that tried to establish the 
connection between Turkish democracy and Turkish-American relations. The first 
                                                 
1 Some sources also refer to Atatürkism (Atatürkçülük). This thesis will use Kemalism. 
2 Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2002), i. 
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one, Paul Henze’s Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance, argues that 
Turkey’s political regime was not a concern for the U.S.3 The second one, Hakan 
Yılmaz’s “Democratization From Above in Response to the International Context,” 
diametrically opposes Henze’s thesis and posits that Turkish democratization was 
merely an outcome of the efforts to integrate Turkey with the U.S.-led Western 
world.4 It was the U.S. interest in democracy that prompted Turkish policy-makers to 
resort to democratization, argued Yılmaz. The chapter will lay the groundwork for 
the thesis by arguing that the actual connection between Turkish democracy and 
Turkish-American relations is neither as separate as Henze claims, nor as externally-
driven as Yılmaz asserts. The U.S. government was interested in Turkey’s political 
regime. However, that interest did not find its way into U.S. policy towards Turkey. 
The U.S. did not induce Turkey to democratize. Turkish leaders were already 
working on the transition to democracy. The transition had as much to do with the 
ideals of Kemalism as with getting into “the Western club.” 
2.2 Kemalism and Democracy 
The relationship between Kemalism, the ideology of the Republic of Turkey, 
and democracy is a paradoxical one. On the one hand, Kemalism, named after 
Turkey’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, introduced massive reforms. The 
institution of a republican government, the separation of the mosque and state, the 
abolition of religious law, its replacement with penal, commercial, and civic codes in 
the Western model, extension of suffrage to women, adoption of the Latin alphabet 
instead of the Arabic script are all well known. 
                                                 
3 Paul Henze, Turkish Democracy and the American Alliance (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993). 
4 Hakan Yılmaz, “Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context,” New 
Perspectives on Turkey 17, (1997): 1-38. 
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Equally well known, however, is the limit placed on political and social 
rights. The press, though still freer in comparison with those in Bolshevik Russia, 
Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, was still kept on a short leash by the government. 
Also, even though Atatürk attempted to institute multi-party politics twice in his life 
in 1924 and 1930, these trials failed and the “monoparty” system remained intact 
until 1945. 
2.2.1 Experiments With Democracy Until 1945 
By the end of World War I, Turkey’s situation was desperate. Much of the 
country lay in ruins and was under foreign occupation. General Mustafa Kemal, who 
had made a name for himself in the Gallipoli theater during the war, organized a 
nationalist uprising in parts of Turkey spared from occupation. He eventually 
succeeded and proclaimed Turkey a republic in 1923, himself becoming president. 
During the War of Liberation, one of the first things that Mustafa Kemal did 
was to convene a national parliament in Ankara in order to garner the people’s 
support for the war. The Turkish Grand National Assembly became a forum of hot 
debate during the war. Even though he was a popular figure among the deputies, 
Mustafa Kemal always made sure that the TGNA had its say on matters. Indeed, 
Mustafa Kemal acted on a mandate from the assembly, which could have been 
revoked any time. Arguably, the War of Liberation witnessed the initial experiments 
with democracy. Upon the proclamation of the republic, the TGNA was not 
dissolved and a bipartisan political system came into being.5 
                                                 
5 İhsan Güneş, Birinci TBMM’nin Düşünce Yapısı, 1920-1923 (The Ideological Structure of the First 
TGNA, 1920-1923) (Eskişehir: Anadolu University, 1985; reprint, Ankara: İş Bankası Yayınları, 
1995). For a detailed account of the War of Liberation, Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire to Republic: 
The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923 A Documentary Study (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu, 2000). 
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Seeing that Turkey should never suffer such destruction again, Mustafa 
Kemal embarked on a vigorous program of modernization. Western phenomena, 
especially scientific techniques and political ideas, were introduced. The caliphate 
and sultanate were abolished, religious societies and schools were closed down, 
replaced with secular ones. Several years later, Mustafa Kemal adopted the Latin 
alphabet instead of the traditional Arabic script. Also to that end, Mustafa Kemal 
formed his own party, the Republican People’s Party, while allowing the formation 
of the Progressive Republican Party. The idea was to create an environment 
amenable to political democracy while carrying out the reforms. Almost 
immediately, however, he realized that he could not strike a balance between 
democracy and his reforms. The Progressive Party began receiving support from 
those groups opposed to Mustafa Kemal’s reforms, forcing him to close it down. 
Defending his methods in his Büyük Nutuk (Grand Address) in October 1927, he 
argued that “our new laws, the assurance of all our Nation’s accomplishments in the 
social and economic realms, as well as the civic code, sanctioning women’s liberty, 
were brought about at that time.”6 
Mustafa Kemal’s second attempt to establish multi-party democracy came in 
1930, right after the Great Depression. Arguing for the need of an opposition party to 
aid the RPP government in formulating healthier economic policies, Fethi (Okyar) 
established the Free Republican Party under the auspices of Mustafa Kemal, which 
the latter “presented to the public as a genuine opposition party.”7 At first, Mustafa 
Kemal assumed a neutral position vis-a-vis both parties. He was confident of the 
initial role that he bestowed on the FRP as a loyal opposition. However, the FRP, just 
                                                 
6 M. Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk (Address) (İstanbul: Çağdaş, 1994), 410. 
7 Kemal Karpat, Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1959), 65. 
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like the Progressive Party, became the focus of discontent. FRP rallies in the fall of 
1930 became a platform for those disgruntled by the economic situation as well as 
the political reforms. Finally, “the RPP elite persuaded Mustafa Kemal, who initially 
had professed neutrality with respect to both parties, to change his position to support 
the Republican Party.”8 Opposition to the reforms, coupled with economic 
discontent, forced Mustafa Kemal to shelve multi-party democracy once again. 
Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk (father of Turks) with the adoption of the family-
name code in 1934, died in 1938. His friend and close associate İsmet İnönü 
succeeded him. İnönü, just like Atatürk, believed that it was only through multi-party 
democracy that Turkey can safeguard the gains of the revolution. 
Before the eruption of World War II, İnönü signaled his pledge for 
democracy. In  a speech he delivered at İstanbul University on March 1939, he stated 
that “as long as the people’s control over the administration is not genuinely and 
physically consolidated, and that as long as the people do not attest to this, it cannot 
be argued that there exists a popular government.”9 Even though multi-party 
democracy was some six years away, İnönü remained committed to the idea. The 
“Independent Group” in the TGNA and allowing independent candidates to run in 
elections indicated that democracy was not totally shelved. 
World War II proved to be a major burden on Turkey. The press was 
significantly curbed. Critics of the governments, as well as Axis and Soviet 
sympathizers, were jailed. Martial law was declared in the country. Not until late-
1947 was it fully abrogated. With the end of the war in Europe, President İnönü 
declared in May 19, 1945 that “as the restrictions necessitated by the precautionary 
                                                 
8 Ibid, 66-7. 
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measures of the war-time are gradually lifted, the principles of democracy will gain 
wider prevalence in our political and intellectual life.”10 
2.2.2 Kemalism as an Authoritarian Ideology 
Notwithstanding the attempts for democratization, Kemalism was an 
authoritarian ideology. In Feroz Ahmad’s words, the political system that Mustafa 
Kemal formed was a “monoparty” system where a separation between the party and 
government did not exist. “In fact, the party was the government...In many cases, 
leaders of the provincial party were also governors of provinces, and almost all state 
officials became members of the RPP.” Even though there was the Grand National 
Assembly, the electoral system was “an indirect system in which the voters elected a 
college of electors who then elected their representatives to the Assembly. This 
system, in use until 1946, enabled the local elites to maintain their power and 
influence in the Assembly throughout the monoparty period.”11 
Furthermore, following the Great Depression of 1929, the economy came 
under the strict control of the government. According to Ertan Aydın, “the world 
depression with its economic and psychological consequences propelled Turkey into 
a new political search mostly grounded in radical and anti-liberal ideas.”12 The 
absence of an entrepreneurial class, unlike Western democracies, resulted in the 
absence of a civil society in the country and further weakened claims to democracy. 
The intellectual spectrum was also homogenized with the failure of the 
second multi-party experiment and liberal economic policies. The clash between 
                                                                                                                                          
9 “İsmet İnönü’nün İstanbul Üniversitesi Konuşması - Mart 1939” (İsmet İnönü’s Speech at Istanbul 
University – March 1939) in Cemil Koçak, Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi, 1938-1945, (The National 
Chief Era in Turkey, 1938-1945) (Ankara: Yurt, 1986; reprint, İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), 2:25.   
10 Ulus, May 20, 1945. 
11 Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst & Company, 
1977), 1-3. 
12 Ertan Aydın, “The Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The Ülkü Version 
of Kemalism, 1933-1936” (Ph.D. diss., Bilkent University, 2003), 62. 
 11 
rightist Ülkü and leftist Kadro movements arguably left the country in dearth of a 
liberal ideology. Ülkü’s “preoccupation with secularism and secular morality for the 
preparation of society to an ‘ideal democracy’ paradoxically became the basic 
obstacle in front of the Turkish democratic consolidation” and this “provided 
justification for postponing democracy to an uncertain stage of time.”13 For its part, 
Kadro’s stress on the single-party regime and a command economy found its way 
into the Turkish constitution as etatism. Even though both movements died away by 
the late 1930s, they became one of the intellectual foundations of Kemalist ideology. 
Another reason for Kemalism to be labeled as an authoritarian ideology is the 
“chief system.” Mustafa Kemal was bestowed the title of Değişmez Genel Başkan 
(Permanent Party Chairman) in the RPP Congress in 1927. Following his death in 
1938, he was proclaimed Ebedi Şef (Eternal Chief), his successor İnönü assuming the 
title of Milli Şef (National Chief). Even though the title was mostly symbolic, it gave 
the Turkish system an authoritarian taste. The “chiefdom” was to remain in place 
until 1946. 
At any rate, Atatürk was aware of his country’s shortcomings. For him, the 
problems of backwardness and democratization could be remedied by modernization. 
Indeed, democracy, Westernization, and modernization meant the same thing. He 
reportedly said in the mid-1920s that “Turkey is going to build up a perfect 
democracy” and continued: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid, 5. 
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How can there be a perfect democracy with half the country in 
bondage? In two years from now, every woman must be freed from 
this useless tyranny. Every man will wear a hat instead of a fez and 
every woman will have her face uncovered; woman’s help is 
absolutely necessary and she must have full freedom in order to take 
her share of her country’s burden.14 
 
U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew, who served in Turkey from 1927 until 1932 
observed Atatürk’s second trial with democracy in 1930: 
Atatürk began to think the single party as a sign of Turkey’s 
inferiority in comparison with Europe and the West. American and 
European writers have in recent years devoted much space to the 
Turkish dictatorship which has often been described as Western in 
form but Oriental in fact. These descriptions have been brought to 
the Gazi’s attention and he has not been pleased.15 
 
2.2.3 Kemalism as a Liberal Ideology 
It was precisely Mustafa Kemal’s displeasure with Turkey’s failure in 
democratization and Kemalism’s authoritarian characteristics that forced him to 
liberalize the country and its ideology. Of Kemalism’s six pillars, namely, 
republicanism, secularism, populism, nationalism, revolutionism/reformism, and 
etatism, the first three pillars are most related to democracy. 
These principles were installed into the constitution in 1937, but were not 
substantiated. Semih Tezcan argues that the “republican government is under the 
protection of the Constitution and cannot be changed. The principle of republicanism 
connotes libertarian democracy and the self-rule of the people, while striking out any 
possibility for a sultanate, caliphate, or dictatorship.” Populism, meanwhile, “offers a 
democratic form of government. It means the self-rule of the people, the formation of 
a government based on the people, and that all actions must aim for the welfare and 
happiness of the people.” As with secularism, it “is the principle where the individual 
                                                 
14 Grace Ellison, Turkey To-Day (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1929),8; quoted in ibid, 8. 
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is free in his religious beliefs and behaviors under the freedom of conscience and 
where the administration of the state is free from religious reaction, thoughts and 
pressures.”16  
These three ideals also translate to certain aspects of American democracy. 
Republicanism is evident. Populism, “the self-rule of the people, the formation of a 
government based on the people,” and “all actions must aim for the welfare and 
happiness of the people” resonates “a government by the people, for the people.” 
Secularism, for its part, is one of the mainstays of the first amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Perhaps the U.S. did not force Turkey to democratize in the 1940s 
because many of the principles deemed essential to American democracy were 
already part of Kemalism. 
Dictatorship under Kemalism was never institutionalized. Indeed, it was 
considered harmful for Turkey. Furthermore, government terror did not exist and the 
press was relatively free from 1923 until World War II.17 
British historian Andrew Mango defends Atatürk and Kemalism by putting 
them in the context of the interwar period: “Countries more prosperous than Turkey, 
with better-educated societies and a longer history as nation states, were unable to 
sustain democratic practices...That Atatürk favored democracy can be inferred from 
the fact that he admired France, Britain, and the United States rather than Fascist 
Italy, Nazi Germany, and Bolshevik Russia.”18 Turkish scholar Mustafa Yılmaz 
agrees: “It must be borne in mind that while there was a single-party rule in Turkey, 
totalitarian regimes were ruling most of the world and no other country in Europe, 
                                                                                                                                          
15 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945, (London: 
Hammond, Hammond & Co., 1953), 869; quoted in ibid, 67. 
16 Selim Tezcan, Kemalist İdeoloji (Kemalist Ideology) (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1980), 4-10. 
17 Karpat, 138. 
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save France and Britain, was ruled by democracy.”19 Arguably, Turkey resembled 
France, Britain, and the U.S. more than Italy, Germany, or Russia. 
For Atatürk, the revolution and the authoritarian system that accompanied it 
were means to an end. He envisioned a Turkey governed by democracy. His reforms 
were directed towards that objective. As Kemal Karpat put it, 
The justification, and the necessity for the strong government which 
prevailed in Turkey between 1923 and 1945 will be a matter of 
discussion for years to come. Whatever turn these discussions may 
take, one still can rightly question whether or not any other solution 
existed to bring about the urgent reforms Turkey needed. A society 
emerging from social and economic inertia, with a large section of 
the population dominated by fatalism, and without a large 
progressive and far-sighted intelligentsia, could not have done 
otherwise. Whatever faults one may attribute to Atatürk, one cannot 
say that he lacked enlightenment, and his enlightenment was 
Turkey’s great fortune.20 
 
Similarly, İsmet İnönü’s enlightenment and his influence on democracy must 
be stressed. Atatürk sowed the seeds of democracy while İnönü enabled it to 
blossom. According to Metin Heper, “if it were not for İnönü, it might have been 
difficult to institutionalize the said reforms, initiate multi-party politics in 1945, and 
prevent it from drifting to a long-term authoritarian regime in the 1950-71 period.”21 
İnönü’s decision to endorse Nihat Erim’s handful of liberals in the RPP (the so-called 
“Group of 35”) rather than Recep Peker’s conservative majority in the cumbersome 
period of 1945-50 determined the outcome of the transition to democracy. 
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Overall, İnönü’s main virtue was, in Dankwart Rustow’s words, having the 
“singular honor of being the world’s only statesman who voluntarily abdicated his 
dictatorial powers so as to make democracy possible.”22 
2.3 Turkey, the United States and the Cold War 
Before the end of World War II, relations between Turkey and the United 
States “could not be called intimate.”23 Although Turkey converged with the West in 
its foreign affairs after its League of Nations membership in 1932, this was mostly 
with Britain and France. With the outbreak of the war in 1939, Turkey signed treaties 
of alliance with the two countries but remained neutral almost until the end of the 
war. 
The question of the Turkish Straits, one of the first sparks of the Cold War, 
was an issue between Turkey and the Soviet Union even before 1945. Following the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany that partitioned 
Poland, Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu went to Moscow in September 
1939 to negotiate a non-aggression pact. Interestingly enough, the demands 
forwarded by the Soviets were identical to those that would be made in 1945.24 The 
Soviets asked for a joint defense of the Straits, which was poised to guarantee them 
single-handed control over the strategic bottlenecks. Concerned for its sovereignty 
and independence, the Turkish government refused. 
With the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Turkish-Soviet 
relations deteriorated. Turkey’s inability to cope with the passage of German 
                                                 
22 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Modernization of Turkey,” in Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A 
Structural and Historical Analysis, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1973): 113; quoted in Metin 
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23 Wilson to the Secretary of State, “Transmittal of Memorandum on Kemalist Policies and Present 
Trends,” dispatch no.125, Ankara, March 30, 1948, IAT, roll 4. 
24 Haluk Ülman, Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri, 1939-1947 (Turkish-American 
Diplomatic Relations, 1939-1947) (Ankara: Sevinç, 1961), 25-27. 
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transport ships disguised as commercial shipping from the Straits, coupled with its 
neutrality, left the Soviets bitterly resentful of their neighbor’s position. 
Upon receiving the Turkish government’s request for renewing the Treaty of 
Friendship of 1925, the Soviet Union replied on March 19, 1945 that the renewal was 
only possible if Turkey would agree to the joint defense of the Straits, as well as 
territorial concessions in eastern Turkey.25 To that end, Stalin raised the question 
with Britain and the United States at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The three 
allies, without committing themselves to any course of action, promised to work in 
tandem for the revision of the Montreux Convention administering the regime of the 
Straits. 
The demands from Turkey proved to be one of the greatest blunders in Soviet 
foreign policy. Along with the problems between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
elsewhere, President Harry Truman started to complain of “babying the Russians.”26 
Soviet policies inadvertently brought Turkey and the U.S. closer.27 
U.S. policy towards Turkey underscored overall U.S. policy against the 
Soviet Union. The two intertwined elements that formed this policy were anti-
Communism and geostrategy. According to Melvyn Leffler, 
the fusion of ideological competition with geostrategic threat made 
American officials keenly sensitive to the vulnerability of their 
domestic political and economic institutions. In their view, 
configurations of power in the international system had a significant 
bearing on whether they could preserve individual liberties and a 
private market economy at home.28  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 51. 
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Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s position on Communism 
summarized American perceptions: “In Acheson’s view ‘Communism as a doctrine 
[was] fatal to a free society and to human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Communism as an aggressive factor in world conquest [was] fatal to independent 
governments and to free peoples.’”29 With respect to strategic concerns, the prospect 
of Eurasia falling under Soviet control was a significant danger: “If Eurasia came 
under Soviet domination, either through military conquest or political and economic 
‘assimilation,’ America’s only potential adversary would fall heir to enormous 
natural resources, industrial potential, and manpower.”30 
As for Turkey’s importance, Loy Henderson, the State Department’s Director 
of Near East and African Affairs, argued in October 1946 as follows: 
Strategically, Turkey is the most important factor in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East. By its geographical position, 
Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through 
which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively 
flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.31 
 
Just like in Turkey, anti-Communism and geostrategy were of great concern 
for the U.S. in neighboring Greece. Greece’s problems were more pressing than 
Turkey’s. Even though there was no express Soviet pressure, Communist guerillas 
operating from neighboring Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia stirred trouble. The 
historical record acquits Stalin of supporting the guerillas during the Greek Civil 
War. The U.S., however, considered this as another move by Moscow to spread 
Communism, which eventually led to the declaration of the Cold War. President 
Truman announced in his historic speech before Congress on March 12, 1947 that “it 
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must be the policy of the United States to support the free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”32 
The Truman Doctrine, as it came to be known, extended $400 million worth 
of aid to Greece and Turkey. It was followed by the Marshall Plan for the 
reconstruction of Western Europe. American reasons for getting involved in Europe 
have been mentioned. But why were the Americans welcomed by these various 
European countries while the Soviets were not? In John Lewis Gaddis’s words, it 
was the Europeans’ “fear of getting something worse.”33 The U.S. represented 
something much more acceptable for Europeans in general and Turks in particular. In 
Norwegian scholar Geir Lundestad’s words, the U.S. became “an empire by 
invitation”: 
Unlike the Soviet Union, which frequently had to rely on force, the 
United States was generally encouraged to take a more active 
interest in the outside world. The American influence often went 
deeper than the Soviet exactly because Washington’s forms of 
control were more in accordance with the will of the local 
populations than were Moscow’s.34 
 
2.4 Previous Attempts to Link Turkish-American Relations and 
Turkish Democracy 
 
There are two schools of thought when looking at Turkish-American relations 
and Turkish democratization from 1945 until 1950. On the one hand, some scholars 
attribute Turkish transition to democracy strictly to the intrinsic characteristics of 
Turkey’s republican ideology. For this school, transition to democracy in the 1945-
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1950 period had nothing to do with Turkey’s relations with the U.S. Paul Henze 
states that 
the nature of [Turkey’s] government was not a matter of 
controversy in the United States during this period. Atatürkism as a 
political philosophy aimed at modernization and adoption of 
Western civilization with all features Americans consider essential 
for democracy: a pluralist society, equal rights for all citizens, 
separation of church and state, a multiparty parliamentary system 
with rule of law and an independent judiciary.35 
 
More recently, some scholars have taken a diametrically opposite view. 
Turkish democratization, they argue, was nothing but a tactic by Turkish statesmen 
in order to integrate Turkey into the Western alliance. Hakan Yılmaz maintains that 
the [Turkish] state undertook democratic reform in response to the 
international context. Liberalizing and democratizing the regime 
was a political reform undertaken by the state leaders as an 
instrument in their overall foreign policy strategy of getting fully 
integrated with the newly emerging U.S.-led Western camp. 36 
 
Furthermore, Yılmaz argues that “the Turkish government’s constant refusals 
to participate in the war on the Allied side and its conciliatory, and at times openly 
collaborative, policies towards Nazi Germany in the initial years of the war” made 
matters worse. As such, when the Soviets extended their demands on the Straits and 
territory, “the attitude of the Americans was at best indifferent to and at worst 
supportive for the Soviet position.”37 
Even though Yılmaz has a point with respect to the motives of Turkish 
policy-makers (this thesis argues otherwise), his statement on American support for 
the Soviet position is misleading. Britain and the U.S. hesitated to recognize Soviet 
demands at Potsdam and thereafter. In the Moscow conference of foreign ministers 
in December 1945, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told his American 
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counterpart James Byrnes that “His Majesty’s Government could not be indifferent 
to a Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her. We could not agree to the 
Soviet request for a base in the Straits and for the return of Kars and Ardahan.”38 
Byrnes agreed. The U.S. was already viewing Turkey as a strategic asset. There was 
no question of Americans to appease the Soviets on Turkey. 
For their part, studies on strategic calculations do not mention 
democratization. No connection between Turkish democratization and U.S. strategy 
appears. The principal U.S. aim in converging with Turkey was to further U.S. power 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. These works focused on “the historical struggle for power 
along the Northern Tier as an important factor in the origins and development of 
what later became known as the Cold War,”39 the Northern Tier being Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran. But that search for strategic gain also had a political consequence. 
Aware of the danger of counter-factualism, it is still a fruitful question to ask to what 
extent Turkey could have liberalized its system had it not been for its strengthened 
relations with the U.S., not to mention the prospect of falling under Soviet 
domination. 
2.5 Conclusion 
There is fertile ground that one can cover by looking at the interaction of the 
Turkish-American partnership and Turkey’s transition to democracy. 
Democratization was an item in the relations. But it came about due to the efforts of 
Turkish statesmen, particularly those of President İsmet İnönü. Many American 
observers attested to this fact. Democratization was neither fully internally-driven, 
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nor a mere tool at the hands of Turkish politicians to bring Turkey closer with the 
U.S. The U.S. observed the transition to democracy closely, which probably was the 
reason why it did not urge Turkey to democratize. Although U.S. policy towards 
Turkey was determined by strategic motives, that policy helped Turkey’s transition 
to democracy. Indeed, democracy and anti-Communism were used synonymously in 
the period under question. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE FIRST PERIOD:  
DEMOCRACY RECEIVES MODEST ATTENTION, 1945-1947 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Until President Truman’s historic speech in March 1947, the U.S. 
government, except for its embassy at Ankara, was not cognizant of the development 
of democracy in Turkey. Only after Truman declared the U.S. position vis-a-vis 
Greece and Turkey, and of course, the Soviet Union, to be the support of “free 
peoples” did the U.S. focus on democratization in Turkey. 
Despite Turkish policy-makers’ and the embassy’s reference, Washington 
paid closer attention to the development of democracy in Greece while stressing 
Turkey’s strategic importance. Arguably, this was a matter of agency. Following 
World War II, the U.S. was much more involved in Greece’s domestic affairs than 
Turkey’s. American officials monitored the 1946 general elections both in Greece 
and Turkey. However, Washington was much more directly involved in the Greek 
elections in March, sending observers in accordance with the Yalta arrangements. 
With the Turkish elections in July, however, Washington was informed through the 
embassy officials in Ankara who were observing only in an informal capacity. This 
could have been one reason why the U.S. gave modest attention to Turkey’s 
democratization until the Truman Doctrine. 
Another reason could have been that even the Americans were not so sure 
whether democratization was a viable option for Ankara. In his meeting with Senator 
Claude Pepper of Florida and Ambassador Edwin Wilson on October 12, 1945,  
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President İnönü reportedly said that “the day when I can sit in the Assembly as leader 
of the Opposition, I shall regard my role on behalf of Turkey as fulfilled.” However, 
Wilson was not so hopeful of the prospects of democracy in Turkey: 
There are other competent observers who believe that while [the] 
President sincerely desires and intends to proceed on [the] road to 
political democracy, [the] international situation, particularly 
relations with Russia, will make it inadvisable at [the] present time 
to risk throwing [the] country into possible confusion and agitation 
of direct elections free of control by Peoples Party. They doubt 
whether such elections are likely to be held before 1947 when [the] 
elections would normally take place for now four-year term of 
deputies.1 
 
Finally, the Americans considered the July 1946 general elections to be 
unfair. Even though embassy officials acknowledged the voting “to be taking place 
in an orderly quiet fashion” in Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmir, they reported misconduct 
in the countryside.2 The DP’s limited organization and the Turkish government’s 
inexperience with competitive elections, culminating in the RPP’s questionable 
victory, must have left the U.S. policy-makers in doubt with respect to Turkey’s 
experiment with democracy. 
This chapter will concentrate on the interaction of Turkish democratization 
and Turkish-American relations from 1945 until the Truman Doctrine in March 
1947. The periodization is due to the modest attention that Turkish democratization 
received from the U.S. government. Turkey did not receive any inducements from 
the U.S. to democratize. Moreover, Turkish democracy was not mentioned in the 
U.S. As it will be seen in the next chapter, reference to Turkey’s democracy would 
become much more conspicuous after the Truman Doctrine.  
                                                 
1 Wilson to the Secretary of State, telegram no.1352, Ankara, October 19, 1945, IAT, roll 1. 
2 Bursley to the Secretary of State, dispatch no. 992, “Turkish Election Day, July 21, 1946,” Ankara, 
July 21, 1946, IAT, roll 1. 
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This was a time when the U.S. still did not have a definite strategy against the 
Soviet Union. Both sides hoped that they could reach some sort of an 
accommodation over the Turkish Straits, Germany, and eastern Europe. Once the 
prospect of a settlement failed, the Cold War began. 
3.2 Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy From  
the End of the War Until the Truman Doctrine 
 
In February 1945, Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt delineated several 
reasons why the Turkish regime “has been suffering a consistent diminution in 
popularity and public confidence, particularly since the outbreak of war in 
September, 1939.” Turkey’s problems were the ineffective bureaucratic mechanism, 
economic hardship owing to inflation, corruption, the failure of industrialization, and 
the rigidity of the educational system. Steinhardt further situated “the lack of 
freedom of the press and of speech” and “the merest lip-service to democratic forms, 
‘elections’ of deputies being in fact appointments by the single party machine” as 
Turkey’s problems with democracy. Lack of freedom of the press was obvious: 
Newspapers which fail to conform to the standards laid down by the 
Press Bureau are unable to remain in existence, and the slightest 
criticism of the regime or deviation from the official ‘line’ is likely 
to result in a suspension. For example, the leftist newspaper ‘Tan’ 
was suspended on August 12th for demanding a purge of pro-Axis 
officials, and the newspaper ‘Vatan’ on August 30th because it ran 
several articles demanding greater democratization of the Turkish 
government...Those Turks who have traveled or studied abroad, or 
who have observed the freedom of the press existing in the 
democracies and guaranteed in the Atlantic Charter, cannot but be 
dissatisfied with the strict control of the press exercised in their own 
country.3 
 
Nevertheless, Steinhardt gave İnönü some credit: “In all fairness, it should be stated 
that President İnönü has made several tentative efforts to introduce certain measure 
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of democracy...During the elections of 1939 and 1943, the practice of allowing the 
voters some latitude...was introduced.”4 
İnönü was aware of his country’s problems. Even before the end of the war in 
Europe, he gave the following instructions to Foreign Minister Hasan Saka, en route 
to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945: 
The Americans may ask you when we will establish a multi-party 
regime. You will give the following answer to the question: ‘In the 
history of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk was the great reformer. The 
role of İnönü will be to institutionalize the reforms and to establish 
full democracy, which was also the intention of Atatürk himself. 
İnönü would like to have done this before. The many dangers and 
problems that came with war held him back. It is the greatest desire 
of the President to achieve this goal as soon as the war will be over.’5  
 
In his interview with the Reuters correspondent on May 16, Saka followed 
İnönü’s line: “As a political institution, the Republican regime is determinedly 
progressing on the way to modern democracy. Our Constitution can be compared 
with the constitutions of the most advanced countries and surpasses many others.” 
Saka added that every democratic tendency would be allowed to develop in Turkey 
after the war.6 
Back in Turkey, signs of democratization were coming into existence. On 
May 19, on the occasion of Youth and Sports Day, İnönü referred to the Grand 
National Assembly as “our greatest democratic institution,” which “proved in a 
brilliant manner that the democratic regime has educated the people in liberal ideas 
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and has taught them to develop in a free society without falling to anarchy or pulling 
political discussion down to the level of mob rumors.”7 
Even the opposition within the RPP caught the mood. During the debates on 
the UN Charter in the assembly on August 15, Adnan Menderes ascribed an 
important role to the charter: “By ratifying the UN Charter, we do not commit 
ourselves to anything that is not consistent with our Constitution. However, there are 
undeniable inconsistencies between our Constitution and the de facto state of affairs 
in the country.” Menderes further argued for the need to take Turkey’s ratification of 
the charter as an opportunity to enhance democracy.8 
Menderes, together with Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Köprülü, 
fellow members of the opposition in the RPP, had declared their Dörtlü Takrir 
(Manifesto of the Four) in June. The Manifesto called for the establishment of 
parliamentary control over the government, granting the citizens their rights 
envisaged by the Constitution, and for the reorganization of the RPP along these 
principles.9 
According to Hakan Yılmaz, “President İnönü’s response to these demands 
was an even stronger signal for democratization.” On the opening day of the TGNA 
on November 1, he argued that the lack of an opposition party was the only 
shortcoming of the Republic and he invited the dissidents within the RPP to form 
their own political party.10 
The dissidents left the RPP and formed the Democrat Party in January 1946. 
The U.S. embassy foresaw the formation of the new party in November and 
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suggested that “the platform of the proposed new party is said to be based on a return 
to the pure program of Atatürk, liberalized and developed to meet present 
conditions.”11 It was an interesting analysis, for Atatürk had replaced İnönü with 
Bayar as Prime Minister in 1937, largely due to Bayar’s liberal economic policies, 
which Atatürk preferred. 
İnönü set the country’s direction towards greater democracy, even though he 
did not think that the country was ready for it. John Matthew Vander-Lippe, Jr. 
argues that “İnönü offered several reasons why he did so. First, being committed to 
the goal of modernizing Turkey, he thought the country should have a democratic 
regime as soon as possible, because better policies would be formulated from a clash 
of ideas.” Second, “he had been troubled by the fact that under the single-party 
regime, people at different echelons of government were involved in inappropriate 
deeds and he was unaware of such behavior.”12 İnönü’s understanding of 
modernization, together with continuing Atatürk’s mission, led him to liberalize the 
political system. 
İnönü himself downplayed the influence of foreign policy considerations on 
his decision. In an interview with Dankwart Rustow in 1954, he first denied the 
relevance of foreign policy considerations, but “then he visibly relaxed, and with a 
shrewd smile added: ‘And suppose I had been swimming with the stream, that too, is 
a virtue.’”13 Years later Rustow himself recognized that İnönü’s main virtue was 
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having the “singular honor of being the world’s only statesman who voluntarily 
abdicated his dictatorial powers so as to make democracy possible.”14 There was no 
inducement from the U.S. towards Turkey to democratize. Its primary interest in 
Turkey was stability and keeping out the Soviet Union, although interest in 
democracy would come to the forefront as Turkey democratized. 
With its advent, the DP immediately became the locus of those discontented 
with the RPP. A rigorous debate followed. For the DP, the repressive clauses in the 
electoral, police, and press laws had to be modified. The political system had to be 
redefined according to the realities of the new era. For most members of the RPP, 
change had to come gradually. In Yılmaz’s words, RPP members hoped that the DP 
would play “the part of an ornament for democracy,” without laying claims for 
power for “at least 40 to 50 years.”15 
At the Grand Congress of the RPP on May 10, 1946, İnönü declared the 
necessary changes in order to consolidate a democratic regime. First, the ban for 
establishing class-based associations and parties had to be revoked. Second, instead 
of the electoral college, a single-stage electoral system had to be introduced. Third, 
the title of “national chief” had to be replaced with “party chairman.” Finally, free 
elections had to be held.16 The RPP Congress followed suit. Furthermore, it decided 
for the general elections to be held in July, which were normally scheduled for 1947, 
and the local elections at the end of the month. This shocked the DP. On the one 
hand, it was fighting the stringent laws on political parties and on the other hand was 
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still unknown to the constituents. As such, it refused to participate in the local 
elections in protest. Fuat Köprülü, in an interview with the New York Times 
correspondent Aslan Humbaracı on May 14, accused the RPP government of 
resorting to anti-democratic methods. Ambassador Wilson reported the interesting 
reactions to Köprülü by the pro-RPP press that he was playing “into the hands of 
Russia by declaring that all the enemies of Turkey are mobilized for the purposes of 
inciting Anglo-Saxon public opinion against Turkey and of isolating Turkey from the 
Western world.”17 This report reflects how some Turkish intellectuals saw 
democratization as Turkey’s convergence with the Western world. 
Concurrent with these developments in Turkey, the U.S. displayed more 
interest in Greece’s internal affairs. The report of the “Allied Mission for Observing 
the Greek Elections,” comprising American, British, and French observers, 
considered the general elections of March 31 “on the whole free and fair,” with the 
results representing “a true and valid verdict of the Greek people” and “capable of 
standing comparison as to decorum with general elections in France, Great Britain, 
and America.” Moreover, “complete freedom of the press of Greece was found to 
characterize the election period.”18 A few days before the elections, Secretary of 
State James Byrnes said that “as friends of the Greek people, we are interested in 
seeing them elect a representative Government. We believe that only when the Greek 
people have freely expressed their will at the polls...can the work of reconstruction, 
which is so vital to the welfare of Greece, go forward satisfactorily.”19 Greece was 
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continuously praised in U.S. official circles. Indeed, its democracy was stressed 
much more than its strategic significance. This posits an interesting contrast between 
the outlook towards the two countries which were the greatest cornerstones in the 
U.S.’s plans against the Soviets in the eastern Mediterranean. 
In the meantime, the U.S. was more interested in the Turkish Straits, “the 
stopper in the neck of the bottle,” than Turkish democracy. As early as mid-1945, 
President Truman determined the “selfish control of the waterways of Europe” as 
“one of the persistent causes of wars in Europe in the last two centuries.”20 Accepting 
the Soviet propositions for revising the Montreux Convention, the U.S. forwarded 
four principles. First, the Straits had to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations 
at all times. Second, the Straits had to be open to the transit of the warships of Black 
Sea powers at all times. Third, passage through the Straits had to be denied to the 
warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of 
the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United 
Nations. Fourth, certain changes had to be affected in order to modernize the 
Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the United Nations for the League 
of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.21 Turkey announced that it 
would “participate in an international conference on the Dardanelles and accept any 
decisions reached there,” given that “Turkey’s independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are not infringed.”22 
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The Soviet note of August 7, 1946 to the U.S. was mostly in line with the 
American position, except on two important items. First of all, the Soviet Union 
wanted the formation of a new regime by the Black Sea littorals. Second, it argued 
that the defense of the Straits should be jointly assumed by Turkey and the Soviet 
Union.23 In response, the U.S. asserted that “the Soviet note does not appear to 
envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention...but rather the establishment of a 
new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers.” 
The U.S. reply of August 19 further stated that  
it is the firm opinion of this Government that Turkey should continue 
to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the 
Straits become the object of the attack or threat of attack by an 
aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to 
international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the 
part of the Security Council of the United Nations.24  
 
The exchange of notes soon died down without the revision of the Montreux 
Convention. However, the Soviets would not officially renounce their claims on the 
Straits and eastern Turkey until Khrushchev’s incumbency. 
 While these events were taking place in the international scene, general 
elections were held in Turkey on July 21. Once more an RPP majority dominated the 
assembly with the DP winning some 64 seats. Several reasons can be attributed as to 
why the DP performed so poorly. Two months after its establishment, the DP had 
opened branches in sixteen provincial seats out of the existing sixty-three provinces, 
in thirty-six district seats, and in several villages.25 Nevertheless, this organization 
was not enough to warrant an electoral victory, which probably was the reason why 
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the RPP rescheduled the elections to an earlier date. Indeed, the DP was barely able 
to nominate 250 candidates for the 450-seat assembly. 
Even though the DP did not lack popular support, the people’s resentment for 
their economic conditions led to low voter turnout, accounting for the DP’s poor 
performance. The embassy witnessed this phenomenon. Third Secretary Richard 
Gnade, who visited Eskişehir and İzmit in early-July, reported that “often I met with 
considerable skepticism as to any change for the better which might come about 
should the Democrats win.” Gnade mentioned an interesting conversation with a man 
wondering “who cares who wins – Republicans or Democrats – the generals in the 
Army won’t change, and they are the ones who really set policy in the country.”26 
On election day, the embassy reported “no evidence of pressure being put on 
the voters.” At the polling stations they visited in Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmir, “the 
voting seemed to be taking place in an orderly quiet fashion.” However, “in the 
country districts where the kaymakam (district administrators) and the gendarmerie 
commanders are in complete control, there have been numerous press reports of 
arbitrary action by these local officials.”27 
The elections of July 1946 were conducted in an atmosphere of relative 
freedom. In fact, in comparison to present-day Turkey, where the press is barred 
from estimating electoral results in order not to influence voters, a quick look at the 
newspapers of July 1946 reveals the freedom they enjoyed. Before the elections, the 
pro-opposition Vatan reported that the DP had a high chance to win in many 
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provinces. Its chief editor, Ahmet Emin Yalman, referred to July 21 as “judgement 
day.”28 
However, the general elections of 1946 were hardly the finest hour of Turkish 
democracy. The İstanbul Martial Law Command issued an order to pro-opposition 
papers to stop their attacks on the government.29 Counselor of the embassy Herbert 
Bursley recorded electoral misconduct as follows: 
Ballots were in most cases burned within twenty-four hours after the 
polling, so that no recount was possible. It is apparently in the 
election committees, both in the precincts and in the district and 
provincial tabulation centers, that the Republican People’s Party 
organization in a number of places was able to alter the figures to 
give the victory to People’s Party candidates, regardless of how the 
actual count for each candidate stood.30 
 
Following the elections, İnönü started looking for a prime minister; someone 
who could both be conciliatory towards the DP but also firm enough to withstand the 
storms of multi-party democracy. Failing to find a suitable candidate, he turned to the 
most unlikely character of Recep Peker who was not exactly an advocate of multi-
party democracy. 
Why did İnönü choose Peker? The answer probably lies in Peker’s 
background. Peker is one of the most eccentric characters of Turkish political 
history. He had suggested Atatürk to install the “Republican” clause in the party’s 
title in 1924. Owing to his organizational skills and vigorous character, he served 
several times as secretary-general of the RPP and as minister in different 
governments throughout the 1920s and 30s. Even though Atatürk was fond of him, 
Peker’s 1936 report, which proposed the reorganization of the RPP along the lines of 
the Italian Fascist Party, met Atatürk’s bitter hostility. Atatürk reportedly exclaimed 
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“what the hell has Recep done again?” and told his aide Hasan Rıza Soyak that “my 
intention is that should an anti-monarchical current take over the world in the future, 
even those who demand a sultanate can form a party in this country.”31 Whereas he 
fell from Atatürk’s grace, Peker remained an important figure in the party. When the 
test of multi-party democracy came in 1946, İnönü probably wanted to have a 
“bitter” figure leading the government so that he could play the “sweet” towards the 
DP.32 
Even though Peker was not a champion of democracy, he still propagated it in 
his encounters with prominent Americans. In one of his meetings with Ambassador 
Wilson, Peker explained “that the nations should be ruled by supermen is not 
natural.” Moreover, he saw it his duty “to set up a Turkish state apparatus 
automatically working on the basis of Democratic principles.”33 
In a meeting with Harold Lasswell of the State Department’s Division of 
News and Cultural Affairs on September 3, 1946, Peker expressed his enthusiasm for 
“America to abandon its policy of isolationism and to become the order-setter in 
world affairs,” and “how Turkey led the forefront in this sentiment.” Upon 
Lasswell’s comment that his division was interested in the freedom of the press and 
that he had visited Germany, Austria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia before coming to Turkey, Peker responded that “as Turkey had 
nothing to hide, the press was free to an incomparable degree with the said 
countries.” Lasswell concurred with Peker and mentioned “how the steps taken in 
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Turkey towards freedom of the press was well-received in America” and added that 
“such steps also made things easier for them.”34 
A few days later, in another meeting with Jeanette Rankin, former member of 
Congress, Peker remarked that “it was a source of joy and admiration for America to 
abandon isolationism and to serve the ideology of humanity with its material, moral, 
and technical might in the postwar world.” Peker ironically praised America for 
“demonstrating that it was willing to fight to preserve freedom,” probably unaware 
that he was talking to the only member of the U.S. Congress who voted against the 
declaration of war in December 1941. Learning that Rankin was on her way to visit a 
friend in Tarsus, Peker jokingly suggested that maybe she would work for the RPP 
there, to which Rankin said “I will work for you in America.”35 
The reception of Turkish democratization in the American press was not 
always so supportive of democratization. An editorial which appeared on the 
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin on August 3, 1946, apparently “stated that for a small 
power like Turkey, democracy was almost an unattainable luxury, and that Turkey 
needed a strong government even if the freedom of the individual were not 
guaranteed as in the United States.” The embassy reported that the editorial 
infuriated the opposition’s newspapers and was challenged by pro-RPP Ulus. Ahmet 
Emin Yalman expressed to the embassy staff “his amazement that an American 
newspaper should so misunderstand and misrepresent the situation in Turkey.” An 
unsigned editorial on Yalman’s Vatan on August 5 called the paper’s writer “Fascist-
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spirited” and “absolutely in the dark insofar as the maturity and ideals of the Turkish 
nation are concerned.” For its part, Ulus printed the editorial on August 5, 
transmitted by the Anatolian Agency from Washington and bluntly commented that 
“we do not agree with the friendly American newspaper. There will not only be a 
strong government in Turkey, but also laws to safeguard the freedom of Turkish 
citizens, as in the United States.”36 
These episodes suggest that starting in mid-1946, Turkish democratization 
began to receive some attention in the U.S. and presented a medium of dialogue 
between the two countries. However, the connection was not as intense as it would 
be with the declaration of the Truman Doctrine. At this point, strategic factors were 
still the U.S.’s primary concern. Based on the August 23 memorandum by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Loy Henderson, Director of the State Department’s Near East and 
African Affairs, considered Turkey “the most important factor in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East” and added that “by its geographical position, 
Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political 
and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and 
Middle East.”37 
As expected, the relations between the Peker government and the DP were 
constantly uneasy. Peker’s disregard for the opposition, economic mismanagement, 
and the crass behavior of a majority of RPP members acquainted with the methods of 
the single-party days, caused a clash between the RPP and DP. The clash evolved 
into a political crisis in December. Adnan Menderes delivered a powerful but 
respectful speech during the hearings on the budget, criticizing the Peker 
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government’s economic policies. In response, Peker appeared before the assembly 
and called Menderes a “psychopath,” which resulted in the immediate withdrawal of 
DP deputies in protest.38 
To defuse what could have become a major crisis, President İnönü stepped in 
on behalf of the DP, assuring them that their presence in the assembly was much 
needed. Commenting on the event, Ambassador Wilson praised İnönü for “his 
determination to establish Western democracy in Turkey, which gained him the favor 
of the opposition.”39 
3.3 The Truman Doctrine 
 
In many respects, President Truman’s speech before the joint session of 
Congress on March 12, 1947 represents the U.S.’s declaratory commitment to 
democracy and the firing shot of the Cold War. Reference to Greece’s democratic 
credentials was straightforward in what later became the Truman Doctrine: “Greece 
must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting 
democracy...No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for 
a democratic Greek Government.” Regarding the problems of governance in Greece, 
Truman argued that 
one of the chief virtues of a democracy...is that its defects are always 
visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and 
corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it 
represents 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who 
were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 
692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the 
views of the Greek people.40 
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As with Turkey, however, no such points were made, despite the fact that it 
had held relatively free elections the previous year. In contrast, Truman maintained 
that “the circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different 
from those of Greece...nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.”41 This 
essentially meant that Turkey was not a democracy, but its independence was under 
threat and the U.S. had to help. 
Some scholars have been skeptical towards President Truman’s inclusion of 
Turkey with Greece: “Congressional approval of aid to Turkey was assured primarily 
because of association with concern over Greece,” argues George Harris.42 For 
Melvyn Leffler, Turkey, despite being in no imminent danger, was thrown into the 
lot with Greece in order to gain a leverage against the Soviet Union and thwart the 
“eventual projection of Soviet power into the eastern Mediterranean and the Near 
East.”43 
As far as the Turks were concerned, however, the Truman Doctrine qualified 
as an American commitment to Turkish democracy. Nihat Erim argued in his column 
in Ulus on March 13 that there was a deeper meaning for the U.S. to extend a helping 
hand to Turkey: The fact that the U.S. wanted to protect Turkey’s independence 
signified its appreciation of its democratic character.44 On March 15, Erim added that 
“the National Assembly method, characterized by free debate and multi-party 
politics, could have degenerated as it did elsewhere.” However, the Turkish regime 
“did not accept dictatorship, violence, and terror in any form” and claimed that 
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“those who look at Turkey from abroad must have seen its position.”45 Others 
considered Truman’s speech as “the most important turning point in world politics at 
this century”46 and labeled the U.S. as a “peacemaker.”47 Son Telgraf proclaimed that 
“America takes [the] leadership of democratic world front” 48 while DP leader Celal 
Bayar’s statements were as follows:  
We welcome with great satisfaction and gratitude [the] Truman offer 
[to] aid Turkey. [The] Great American democracy, knowing well 
[the] dangers [of] totalitarian regimes for world peace and human 
freedom, did not abandon [the] UN Charter as only theory but 
proved [that] it will not hesitate [to] make sacrifices for its 
realization.49 
 
To be sure, the U.S. government had other motives than those expressed in 
the Truman Doctrine. Leffler argues that the strategy to garner Republican support in 
Congress for Truman’s foreign policy by “scaring the hell out of them,” “sought to 
lock the Republicans into support for an American leadership role around the world.” 
Furthermore, 
Truman’s political advisors...knew that fighting Communism 
resonated with the American people as did no other foreign policy 
slogan, because Communism was seen as an alien ideology 
poisonous to private enterprise and democratic pluralism and 
repugnant to ethnic Americans who saw their brethren in Eastern 
Europe oppressed by the Soviet behemoth. In the minds of 
Americans, Soviet Communism was no different than Nazi 
totalitarianism.50 
In the final analysis, the Truman Doctrine can also be read as a domestic policy 
maneuver by Truman to enhance his standing and to secure bipartisan support in 
Congress for his foreign policy. 
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Besides democratization, Turkey also had other problems. The financial 
burden of maintaining a large standing army in the face of Soviet demands precluded 
any prospect of domestic reform. Soviet presence in Turkey was a very frightful 
prospect. It was viewed as a direct threat to national independence. Haluk Ülman 
claimed that “all experiences demonstrated that whichever country Soviet forces 
entered, it fell under Soviet ascendancy shortly thereafter...Soviet forces entering 
Turkey under the pretext of protecting the Straits would soon want to bring all of 
Turkey under their control.”51 
As far as the U.S. was concerned, Turkey was not a democracy, despite its 
desire to become one. President İnönü was doing his best to overcome this problem 
and bring Turkey closer with the U.S. while also fulfilling his promise to the Turkish 
people for greater democracy. Greece was “closer” to American policy-makers for 
being a democracy. On March 28, 1947, just a few days after the declaration of the 
Truman Doctrine, Ambassador Paul Porter told the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs that he “developed admiration for the democratic spirit of the average Greek 
citizen” and that the Greeks were “eager to perfect their democratic institutions if 
given the opportunity.” For that reason, they needed “material assistance and 
technical guidance if they are to function as a free, self-sustaining democracy.”52 The 
aid bill for Greece and Turkey was promoted by the State Department officials in 
constant reference to Greek democracy. Turkey was intermittently mentioned. In a 
strange episode, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson cited Senator Daniel 
Webster’s speech in Congress during the Greek War of Independence in the 1820s. 
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Acheson avoided any remark, of course, that back then they were fighting the 
Turks.53 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Primary U.S. interest in Turkey from the end of World War II until the 
Truman Doctrine was geostrategy. A contrast with neighboring Greece seems quite 
to the point. Even though the Truman Doctrine put the two countries on the spot, 
different reasons determined this outcome. The period of this chapter witnessed this 
phenomenon. While Greece’s democratic character was stressed by American 
policy-makers, Turkey’s strategic importance weighed more. On the contrary, some 
Americans actually questioned the viability of democratization for Turkey. Turkish 
democratization had more to do with the policies of President İnönü than any 
inducement by the U.S. This is not to suggest that the U.S. was not interested in 
Turkey’s democratization. However, the rhetoric of democracy did not take root in 
the American side the way it did with Greece until the Truman Doctrine. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE SECOND PERIOD:  
DEMOCRACY COMES TO THE FOREFRONT, 1947-1950 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the Truman Doctrine, Turkish democracy came to the forefront in 
American policy-making. Previously, the U.S. emphasized Greek democracy and 
Turkey’s strategic position. The Truman Doctrine not only confirmed and 
consolidated the differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, thus declaring 
the Cold War, it also set the reason for Truman’s declaration: “To support the free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”1 
It cannot be argued that democracy totally replaced Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance. However, reference to democracy increased remarkably when American 
officials discussed Turkey after the Truman Doctrine. This was not the case during 
the first period from the end of the war in 1945 until March 1947. At this stage, 
Turkish politics was undergoing a tremendous transformation from single-party rule 
to multi-party democracy while the “Grand Alliance” between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union was crumbling. 
With the advent of the second period, reference to democracy did not always 
come about in a positive way. When Americans discussed Turkey, many, especially 
members of Congress, considered Turkey undemocratic. Some even questioned  
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whether it would not be more sensible to let Greece and Turkey fall under the Soviet 
sphere of influence since their regimes were more compatible with the Soviets’. 
Those supporting Turkey defended their position by stressing the fact that Turkey 
was democratizing. As it will be seen, these discussions did not influence Turkish 
policy-makers to a significant degree. They were already busy with democratization. 
Nevertheless, democracy continued to be an interesting connection, signifying the 
convergence of the two countries. 
This chapter will examine how this convergence came about. It will be argued 
that even though the U.S. did not induce Turkey to democratize, citing Turkey’s 
democracy remarkably increased. The elections of May 14, 1950 resulted with the 
DP coming to power. Coupled with Turkey’s decision to participate in the Korean 
War a few months later, the allusion to Turkey’s democratic character reached a 
peak. 
4.2 Turkish-American Relations and Turkish Democracy From  
the Truman Doctrine Until the Elections of May 14, 1950 
 
Following the Truman Doctrine, the administration asked the Congress for 
$400 million for Greece and Turkey. Congress, on the other hand, did not want to 
throw money to what it perceived as corrupt and undemocratic regimes. Despite 
Truman’s emphasis on Greece’s democracy, both countries were seen as 
undemocratic. According to George Harris, “Turkey’s democracy appeared too 
young to inspire confidence among Western observers; indeed, the Turkish regime 
was strongly criticized on these grounds during the congressional hearings on the 
Truman Doctrine.”2 
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Haluk Ülman delineates three criticisms raised against Turkey during the 
hearings on the bill for the aid. First, just like Greece, Turkey was seen as an 
authoritarian regime, disrespectful of human rights and freedoms. Should the U.S. 
aid these countries, it would only strengthen them. Some members of Congress 
feared that even though Turkey was moving along the path of democracy, the 
government might use the funds to suppress the opposition.3 Second, Turkey 
remained neutral during the last war and even showed sympathy and gave help to the 
Nazis. To help such a state would betray the cause of the United Nations.4 Third, 
some members of Congress argued against helping Turkey due to the Armenian 
question.5 Of these three, the first point received the greatest attention by American 
public opinion. 
Representative George H. Bender of Ohio was one of the most vocal critics of 
Turkey. In a speech he delivered before the House floor, he declared: 
It will be an unparalleled act of hypocrisy for this House to vote an 
act which guarantees the freedom of the press to the American 
newspapers when that freedom we know for an absolute fact does 
not exist in Turkey today. That arrogant Turkish military dictatorship 
is asking us for money with the full knowledge that they intend to 
violate every provision required by the Congress.6 
 
In order to thwart these objections, the administration defended the aid on the 
grounds that as it would alleviate Turkey’s domestic and foreign burdens, it would 
also help for the establishment of full-fledged democracy, one of the objectives of 
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the aid bill.7 The State Department’s “Interim Greece-Turkey Assistance Committee” 
suggested stressing these two themes to Congress and the public: That “a cardinal 
objective of United States foreign policy is a world in which nations shall be able to 
work out their own way of life free of coercion by other nations” and that “through 
the granting of assistance we intend to help the Greek and Turkish nations to develop 
their free institutions.”8 Randall Bennett Woods looked at Senator J. William 
Fulbright’s position during the debate, which was quite representative of other 
members of Congress:  
The president’s proposals came under attack from liberal 
senators...Turkey was not a democracy and had remained neutral 
during most of World War II. Why not, these critics asked, let 
Greece and Turkey pass into the communist world? The two nations 
would simply be changing one form of undemocratic government for 
another. The Truman administration could only answer that, with 
economic help, Greece might gradually embrace democracy, and 
Turkey was already moving away from the autocratic era of Mustafa 
Kemal. Under noncommunist regimes, the future was at least 
hopeful, whereas under communist rule it was sure to be dark 
indeed. Fulbright agreed...Russia had “brought to a higher state of 
perfection than anyone else the technique of infiltration and 
corruption from within.” Only Nazi Germany was comparable in 
modern history.9 
 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report of April 3 is quite 
informative of American concerns. According to the report, the State Department 
believed “that the prompt extension of aid proposed to Greece and Turkey would 
have the effect of encouraging constructive, democratic forces in other areas and 
thereby of reducing the possibility of similar situations arising elsewhere.”10 Trying 
to alleviate Americans’ traditional dislike of monarchies, which might have 
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complicated matters for Greece, the report argued that “if the Greek people wish to 
have a king, just as the British wish to have one, and the Swedes, the Norwegians, 
and the Dutch, that is a matter for them to decide.”11 Addressing the level of 
democracy in Greece and Turkey, the report stated that  
It is the view of the Department of State that both the Greek and 
Turkish Governments are essentially democratic and that both are 
progressing along the road of democracy. The essential democracy 
of these two Governments is, it is believed, demonstrated by the fact 
that in both countries substantial opposition parties are not only legal 
but are carrying on an energetic campaign of criticism of the 
Government in power without hindrance by the governmental 
authorities. Both countries enjoy freedom of the press to a degree 
which exists in few other countries.12 
 
Finally, thwarting allegations that Turkey held close relations with Germany during 
the war, the report declared that “Turkish neutrality was useful to the United Nations, 
and it is doubtful whether any greater benefits would have been derived from active 
Turkish belligerence.”13 This report was obviously a search for support for the aid 
bill. For one thing, Turkish democracy at this stage was far from perfect. İnönü was 
still trying to accommodate multi-party democracy with politicians accustomed to 
the ways and means of the single-party period. 
For their part, Turkish policy-makers were concerned that the American aid 
would have strings attached to it, making it unacceptable by Turkish public opinion. 
In his encounter with Feridun Cemal Erkin, Secretary-General of the Foreign 
Ministry, the embassy’s counselor Herbert Bursley reported that “Erkin said [the] aid 
law in [its] present form would cause difficulties here, as press reports thereof 
already had, stating [that] this would be [the] case even were application of [the] law 
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moderate.” Bursley felt that “we must try to find a way to maintain reasonable 
control of [the] use [of] our money without giving internal or external foes of [the] 
Turkish Govt. a chance to cry ‘capitulations, Ottoman debt, no confidence in Turkey, 
etc.’”14 
At any rate, American policy-makers still had military calculations in mind 
when they considered the aid to Turkey. In a report dated July 15, 1947, Ambassador 
Wilson indicated that  
money spent on Turkish armed forces can be considered in the 
nature of a national life-insurance premium for the United States. It 
is believed that an equal sum spent for armaments for American 
armed forces would not produce the corresponding effect of reducing 
Russia’s aggressive attitude toward the rest of the world...Because of 
her strategic position Turkey becomes actually the first line of 
defense for the United States in any aggressive move by Russia.15 
 
While formulating the aid program for Turkey, Secretary of State George C. Marshal 
ordered one of his subordinates, Paul F. McGuire, to go to Turkey to conduct “an 
over-all study of the Turkish Armed Forces...to include the Turkish economic and 
industrial potential for national defense and to determine recommendations for 
assistance to Turkey.”16 
In garnering public support for Greece and Turkey, the government officials 
often combined strategic concerns with democracy and anti-Communism. In a 
speech he delivered to a public audience in North Carolina on May 5, Henry Villard, 
the State Department’s Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African 
Affairs, rebuffed allegations “that we are merely supporting so-called reactionary 
regimes without bringing pressure to bear to introduce our own concept of 
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democracy.”17 Villard warned that “it is interesting to note that these arguments are 
precisely what has been heard on the Moscow radio and publicized in the Russian 
press.”18 Villard continued that Greece occupied a vital strategic position in the 
eastern Mediterranean and the failure of democratic institutions there would 
jeopardize Turkey and all of the Near East. Defending Turkish neutrality during the 
war, Villard averred that “at best, a belligerent Turkey could have served the Allied 
cause only by keeping Axis troops from occupying her territory – a result achieved 
anyway by her continued neutrality.”19 As the evidence suggest, even though interest 
for Turkish democracy came to the forefront at this stage, this was coupled with 
Turkey’s strategic significance.20 
On May 22, Congress approved the Greek-Turkish aid bill by a vote of 287 to 
107 in the House and 67 to 23 in the Senate. The bill signified the increasing 
association between the U.S. and Turkey. President İnönü told the Associated Press 
correspondent “that American aid was a step toward the defense of democracy, and 
that closer relations between Turkey and the United States of America would 
contribute to the firm establishment of democracy in Turkey.”21 
Back in Turkey, the DP’s base of support was expanding. Kemal Karpat 
analyzed this phenomenon as follows:  
The Democratic Party attracted the main opposition groups in the 
country regardless of the differences of opinion and interest, and 
regardless of the fact that its program, views, and mentality were not 
known in any detail. Peasants, workers, intellectuals, and landlords 
rallied around to give it the character of a movement. The party 
moved directly into the political fight for power from the very 
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beginning, not as a direct decision of its leaders, but forced by its 
supporters. The leaders became heroes overnight, and few people, if 
any, ever bothered with their opinions or their past affiliations and 
support of the Republican Party, which they now criticized...From 
the beginning, it based its power on the masses instead of the few 
chosen ones. It brought a hope for improvement, awakened a general 
desire for freedom.22 
 
Prime Minister Recep Peker, as can be expected, was not excited of the DP’s 
expansion. Tension between the RPP and the DP mounted from December 1946 until 
July 1947. Meanwhile, relations between the veteran members of the RPP and the 
party’s liberal minority were uneasy. As the DP’s criticisms against the Peker 
government hardened, Peker exclaimed that the DP was seeking a revolution. For 
their part, leaders of the DP complained of the government’s oppressive behavior. 
İnönü, even though displeased with Peker’s lack of refinement, was also 
disappointed with the DP’s tone of voice. Commenting on his meeting with the 
President in early-June, Fuat Köprülü reportedly told Ambassador Wilson that İnönü 
“expressed his uneasiness at the vigor of opposition in the country which he felt 
might lead to disturbances and even revolution.”23 Köprülü and Bayar objected to the 
accusations and defended themselves by saying that “they knew that such a move 
could only bring about the establishment of a heavy-handed dictatorship in the 
country under which the democratic gains of the past year and a half would be 
lost.”24 
On June 14, Köprülü elaborated on his criticisms of the Peker government. 
First, the government’s pressure on the DP caused problems for the smooth 
functioning of democracy. Second, it was problematic for the President to be the 
chairman of a political party at the same time. Third, Köprülü argued that the single-
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party mentality was still firmly embedded in the minds of RPP members and state 
officials.25 Although Herbert Bursley considered some of Köprülü’s points to be 
justified, he was “unfair in not giving President İnönü credit for having been a chief 
instigator of the swing toward democracy which Turkey has witnessed in the past 
year.” For Bursley, adjustment to the dynamics of the new era would take time: “In a 
state where one-party rule prevailed for so many years, a gradual development rather 
than an abrupt change is needed with a consequent metamorphosis of attitude for 
both party and administrative officials who attained their present positions through 
the operation of that one-party system.”26 
Peker, in an interview with the New York Times correspondent on April 17, 
dubbed the DP’s charges “political ballyhoo.”27 He tried to convince the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer correspondent John Leacacos by saying “you also are now living in this 
country...I am sure you can see for yourself that the press IS free” (emphasis from 
the original script). Peker rebuffed the claims that the recent elections for village 
elders were rigged  
by asserting that observers of both Parties were obligated by law to 
witness both the balloting and the counting, but that in some cases it 
conceivably may have been impossible for Democrat observers to 
comply properly with the requirements of the law as to their official 
status of observers.28 
 
At any rate, Peker’s justifications were far from satisfactory. President İnönü, 
in order to resolve the differences between Peker and the DP, held a series of talks 
between the two sides throughout June and July. His declaration of July 12, 1947, the 
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result of these talks, marked another turning point in the history of Turkish 
democracy:  
I have taken the Prime Minister’s statement that the administration is 
in no way suppressing the opposition as a guarantee and passed this 
on to Mr. Bayar. I have also taken the opposition leader’s denial of 
illegal means and methods and his assurance to stay within the 
confines of the law as a satisfactory guarantee and passed it on to the 
Prime Minister. 
 
İnönü admonished the government of its “responsibilities with respect to peace and 
order” and of “impartial and equal treatment of legitimate and lawful political 
parties” as “the basic requirement for a safe political life.”29 
İnönü’s declaration received praise from all sides. Fuat Köprülü called him “a 
personality of historical stature who raised himself above parties and in this capacity 
he belongs to both parties as a national personality.”30 A few weeks later, Bayar 
would tell Tasvir that “I take pleasure in stating that the honorable President of the 
Republic is attached to [the cause of democracy] with great determination and 
enthusiasm. I am convinced that the Declaration of July 12 is an important document 
in the history of democracy.”31 Ambassador Wilson commented that “by this 
outstandingly fair and conciliatory communiqué, the President has well illustrated the 
efforts he is making to promote the development of Western democracy in Turkey” 
and that the declaration will “turn out to be an important milestone in the 
development of democracy in Turkey.” Wilson called Washington’s attention to the 
DP’s status as a respected opposition party: “It is also noteworthy that in a year’s 
time the opposition should have established itself so well as to merit being thus 
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dignified.”32 Some years later, Karpat would call the declaration “one of İnönü’s 
chief achievements.”33 
The timing of İnönü’s declaration was quite interesting. On the same day, 
Ambassador Wilson and Foreign Minister Hasan Saka signed the agreement 
administering the U.S. aid to Turkey. According to Hakan Yılmaz, the declaration 
“was a message to the Americans as much as to the Turks.”34 Though Yılmaz’s 
assertion is debatable, both sides referred to their satisfaction with the agreement. 
Wilson said that the principle to safeguard and respect the two countries’ sovereignty 
and independence guided him.35 Nihat Erim wrote in his column that “Turkey is 
cognizant of the fact that it serves the cause of the West and that its interests coincide 
with the peace and justice-loving members of the United Nations.”36 The embassy 
reported that other newspapers were just as jubilant as Erim. Memleket reported on 
July 14 that “the main thought underlying the Agreement is collaboration between 
the great American democracy and Turkey on a basis of equality and for the purpose 
of protecting peace and security and establishing a free and happy world.” Tanin 
commented that “America knows that an honest, diligent, democratic and peace-
loving nation exists in this crucial point of the Near East which respects the right of 
others and entertains no offensive designs in regard to its neighbors.” In a similar 
tone, pro-DP Son Telgraf connected Turkish-American relations and Turkish 
democracy: “The Agreement signed between Turkey and America...will serve to 
protect the security of the country and insure its economic strengthening, so the 
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democratic movement accelerated under İnönü’s guidance will benefit the nation’s 
recovery.”37 
Many read İnönü’s declaration as his discontent with Peker since it laid more 
emphasis on the government’s responsibilities. Nihat Erim, a close confidant of 
İnönü and the leader of the liberals within the RPP, told an embassy official that 
“İnönü has for a long time been sincerely interested in promoting the development of 
western democracy in Turkey. In 1939, he wanted to establish a multi-party 
system...but the war came along and made it impossible to undertake such a drastic 
change in a time of emergency.” Erim’s personal views regarding democracy owed 
to the education he received abroad. He told an embassy official that “after his return 
from a liberal education abroad, it had been impossible for him to accept the old-
fashioned, Oriental, authoritarian mentality which he found in this country.”38 
Under the aegis of İnönü, the RPP’s liberals attacked Peker. The embassy 
reported the attacks during the vote of confidence for the Peker government in the 
RPP assembly group on August 26: 
After a number of deputies had spoken in favor of the Government 
and had praised the Prime Minister...a bitter attack on the 
Government apparently began, led by a number of younger deputies 
who heretofore have not been prominent on the political scene. The 
sparkplug of the attack seems to have been Deputy Tahsin 
Banguoğlu of Bingöl, who was assisted by another young deputy, 
Cavit Oral, representing Seyhan. Judging from the accounts in the 
press and from statements made to an officer of this Embassy by eye 
witnesses, the dissident deputies bitterly attacked the Peker 
Government on the grounds that it was not living up to the 
conditions established by the President on July 12, that Prime 
Minister Peker was in disagreement with the President and was 
working against him, and that the Peker Government was still 
governed by an ‘authoritarian’ mentality and was incapable of 
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understanding and accepting the basic principles of modern 
democracy.39 
 
When the vote was called, 34 deputies out of 337 cast their votes “nay.” The group 
came to be known as Otuzbeşler, the 35ers, together with Memduh Şevket Esendal, 
who was not present. The embassy reported Erim’s conversation with an embassy 
official on the episode: 
Erim allowed it to be very clearly understood that President İnönü is 
encouraging the new group, in line with his plans to further the 
development of Western democracy and facilitate the free expression 
of opinion. Although according to Erim the President is in basic 
disagreement with the Prime Minister, he is not intriguing against 
him...Erim inferred that if public opinion should turn against Peker 
and cause his downfall, the President would not be disappointed.40 
 
The embassy’s counselor Herbert Bursley commented on the event as follows: 
The fact that there is now a faction within the People’s Party which 
is publicly advocating that the party should completely eradicate the 
influence of the one-party days and hasten the development of 
Western democracy in Turkey is very encouraging. The role which 
President İnönü has played in urging Nihat Erim and his friends to 
speak their minds is further indication of the President’s sincere 
desire to see Western democratic political methods established in 
this country. He has once more added to the great prestige he enjoys 
and strengthened his own political position.41 
 
Peker, for his part, refused to admit publicly that there was a chasm between 
himself and the President. However, a chasm did exist. For one thing, the legality of 
İnönü’s statement of July 12 was controversial. Under the constitution, once the 
Prime Minister’s cabinet received a vote of confidence from the assembly, he would 
only answer to the assembly, not the President. As such, Peker complained that the 
President had no right to step in on behalf of one party or the other, even if that 
President was İnönü. Accordingly, Peker tried to gain the control of the RPP by 
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asking İnönü to assume a neutral position vis-a-vis the two parties. This was Peker’s 
maneuver to effectively isolate İnönü. Peker requested İnönü to allow him to 
integrate the offices of the Prime Minister and Vice-Chairman of the RPP. İnönü did 
not yield to Peker’s requests. Peker resigned on September 9.42 
To do Peker justice, he and other conservative members of the RPP saw a 
danger in the rise of the DP. In Karpat’s words, “behind the claims of democracy, 
they saw the beginning of compromises on the very principles and bases of the 
Republic, on secularism, the very foundation which shaped the whole philosophy and 
the mind of the Republic, on statism, and eventually on freedom itself.”43 Peker’s 
authoritarianism aimed to protect what he perceived as, and helped to create, the 
principal foundations of the Republic. 
Turkish democracy also received close attention by Western press. In a cable 
interview with Virgil Pinkley of the United Press, President İnönü termed Turkey’s 
efforts to develop democratic institutions “serious and sincere” and said that 
“democratic evolution will continue without interruption until it has attained its ideal 
form.”44 According to Ambassador Wilson, this was quite important as “the 
President...once more publicly committed himself to a policy of furthering 
democratic development.”45 Philips Price, a deputy from the British Labor Party, 
wrote at the Manchester Guardian on September 30 that “the issue of civic liberties 
and the rights of the citizen have become alive in Turkey today.” Price further stated 
that “it looked at one time as if Turkey, after her revolution, was going the way of 
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Russia and that the dictatorship of the new order would galvanise into permanency. 
But the history of the last two years shows that this has not been so.”46 Earlier in 
May, an article in the British newspaper Times had likened the RPP and the DP to the 
Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S. because they had no essential 
difference in their programs and both had “right-wing Conservatives, centre 
Moderates, and left-wing Radicals” within their ranks.47 
Back in the U.S., even though Turkish democracy was coming to the 
forefront, Greece enjoyed the privilege of spawning the idea of democracy in ancient 
history. Senator Arthur Vandenberg gave a short but powerful message on occasion 
of the commencement of Greek-language broadcasts by the Voice of America in 
May 1947: “We in the United States have always had great admiration for your 
country and your people. Who can forget that Greece was the cradle of democracy in 
the ancient world?”48 Two years later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson would credit 
Greece not only for democracy but also for international institutionalism: “Greece, 
which gave democracy to the world, was also the site of one of history’s earliest 
attempts to give legal expression to international solidarity on behalf of peace. This 
was the Amphictyonic League, founded by the independent city states of ancient 
Greece five hundred years before Christ.”49 
In a State Department memorandum, dated December 15, 1947, the Turkish 
constitution was honored as it embodied “most of the progressive principles common 
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to the American, French, and British counterparts.” Despite Atatürk’s reforms, “the 
one-party system of government was retained, as it was believed by the Kemalists 
that the democratization of the country must be a slow and gradual process.” The 
memorandum further stated that “the slow but steady progress being made towards 
western democratic forms and practices is in marked contrast to contemporary 
developments in neighboring Balkan countries.”50 
British and American defense establishments had more confidence in 
Turkey’s political system. In the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the two 
governments, Greek leaders’ inability “to establish a stable and efficient 
government...has greatly retarded the economic, social, and political rehabilitation of 
the country. In consequence, it has opened the way to the Communists.”  In Turkey, 
on the other hand, “political conditions...are stable and marked by a definite trend 
toward more complete democracy. It appears unlikely that any special action by the 
U.S. and Britain will be called for this sphere.”51 It can be inferred that the militaries’ 
interest in stability explains why they held different views than their governments. 
At any rate, Greek democracy was far from perfect, just like its Turkish 
counterpart. The Truman administration was also aware of this fact. On December 7, 
1947, the Greek Parliament passed a law that banned strikes and lockouts. The 
presidents of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) sent letters to Secretary of State George Marshall. In his 
reply to William Green of the AFL, Secretary Marshall defended the Greek 
government’s decision on the following grounds:  
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According to our information this law was enacted hurriedly at a 
time when the very security of Greece was in grave danger as a 
result of Communist-inspired terror and violence, and when 
members of the Greek Parliament feared that the outbreak of a 
number of strikes might bring an end to the independence of the 
country.52 
 
Reference to freedom was placed in the context of the animosity that 
Americans felt towards the Soviet Union and Communism. In a letter he sent to 
Senator Vandenberg requesting the continuation of the aid to Greece and Turkey, 
Secretary Marshall insisted that “the totalitarian groups whose aggressive aims have 
thus far been frustrated by the continued existence of a free Greece and a free Turkey 
are convinced that time will play into their hands.” Without explicitly mentioning the 
Soviet Union, Marshall continued that “their leader state, with assurance that the 
United States will soon tire of giving aid to far-off Mediterranean countries...will be 
able to take over by default.”53 
With the incumbency of the moderate Hasan Saka government in Turkey on 
September 10, 1947, the political atmosphere eased considerably. Peker went on the 
defensive and claimed that he was misunderstood and that “if in the future an attempt 
should be made to return to the single-party system in Turkey, he would be in the 
foreground of those working for the re-establishment of an opposition party.” Erim 
was quite surprised to hear this. So was Bursley in his report on the controversy: 
“Nihat Erim went on to say that he was very surprised to learn of the change in 
Peker’s views concerning an opposition. He declared that public opinion was well 
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aware of what the former Prime Minister had thought of the Democrat Party at the 
time of its formation.”54 
One of the Saka government’s important decisions in late-1947 was the 
abolition of martial law in İstanbul and the surrounding provinces. Ambassador 
Wilson argued that the martial law had “ceased to be justifiable from a military point 
of view” and commented that the decision to lift martial law was an indication of the 
government’s desire to normalize conditions in Turkey.55 
Following the commitment of the RPP’s assembly group to liberalize the 
electoral law in January 1948, the embassy informed Washington that “this decision 
is one of the most important domestic political events which have occurred since the 
establishment of the multi-party system in Turkey” and at the same time it is “a 
decisive step forward on the road leading to the establishment of western democracy 
in Turkey.”56 When the electoral law was revised in July, Ambassador Wilson 
termed it “an important step in laying the groundwork for establishing the tradition of 
free and fair elections in this country” and the continuation of “the progress toward 
western democratic institutions.”57 
The embassy’s sympathy for İnönü did not cease during 1948. Following the 
virulent attacks on the President by the extreme right-wing Nation’s Party, first 
secretary Warwick Perkins argued that the attacks were unjustified “for in the past 
two or three years President İnönü has shown definite tendencies towards leading the 
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country away from the so-called ‘Chief System’ (i.e., the pyramiding of power into 
the hands of one man).”58 
American diplomats also witnessed less known yet bizarre affairs in the 
country’s political affairs. Perkins reported on September 30 a recent conversation he 
had with Celal Bayar in İstanbul. For Perkins, Bayar seemed under immense stress as 
they played bridge. For Bayar to call İnönü “cynical” surprised Perkins:  
What, however, surprised me more than anything else was that 
[Bayar] spoke as if he were one of the militant founders of the rival 
Nation’s Party. Indeed, he bluntly referred to the presidential 
declaration of July 12th last year as a deceptive tactic, in unadorned 
language described İnönü as a person more concerned over his own 
position than over the welfare of the nation and the success of the 
cause of democracy in this country, and in quite unequivocal words 
hinted that the present insincere course pursued by the element in 
power would in the end compel the people to take initiative into their 
own hands.59 
 
Perkins commented that it was strange to hear Celal Bayar talk in such a way, whom 
he considered “the staunch advocate of reserve and moderation” and dismissed the 
episode by saying that “it is doubtful whether he actually means what he says.”60 
It was not only American diplomats who were observant of the political 
developments in their host country. In Washington, Turkish Press Attaché Nüzhet 
Baba, in a press summary dated May 11, 1948, commented extensively on the 
upcoming presidential elections. For Baba, American party politics was “corrupt.” 
However, President Truman was an honest man, someone who can be taken for his 
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word. “Nevertheless,” said Baba, “his star in the upcoming elections is not bright.” 
He expected General Dwight Eisenhower to sway the elections if he decided to run.61 
On another report in November 1948, Baba analyzed the problems that 
Turkey faced in its relations with American public opinion. Especially since the 
Greek war of independence, anti-Turkish propaganda created a hostile environment. 
Even though there was some change recently, Baba thought that this was not enough: 
“Even though many works published after 1925 are for us, besides the fact that the 
direction of the Turkish revolution has not taken root in the minds of the people, the 
struggle for democracy during İnönü’s era has had few reflections.” Another stigma 
was the much-debated Capital Levy (Varlık Vergisi). This was the exorbitant tax 
imposed by the Turkish government during World War II to boost revenues. As the 
tax was designed to punish the rich segments of society, Greek, Armenian, and 
Jewish minorities suffered most. In this light, “Turks have always mistreated 
minorities is a deep-rooted opinion here. In the mean time, that a proper explanation 
on the Capital Levy was never made here needs to be stressed on.”62 
Notwithstanding Baba’s pessimism, 1948 was a bright year for Turkish 
democracy and Turkish-American relations. While the embassy sent laudatory 
reports back to Washington, Turkish neutrality in the last war was justified in a 
detailed article by Harry Howard in the Department of State Bulletin. The article put 
much blame on the Soviet Union for not reconciling its differences with Turkey in 
the wake of Nazi expansionism. Indeed, it went far to suggest that Stalin toyed with 
the idea of joining the “Pact of Steel” until he was attacked by Germany in June 
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1941. The article defended Turkey’s position after the Tehran Conference of 
December 1943, which urged Turkey to declare war on Germany. Inadvertently, 
“[Turkey’s] position as a neutral served the interests of the Allies. Had it acted 
prematurely...the entire Near East might well have been thrown open to the Axis 
armed forces in the critical period of 1940-1942.”63 Even though the Soviet Union 
could be blamed for its cordial relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan before June 
1941, Turkey was not immaculate in its wartime record. The article can be perceived 
as a way to justify the U.S.’s support of an evasive neutral that was turning into a 
valuable ally. 
President Truman’s statement on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of the Republic of Turkey in 1948 is also noteworthy. First, Truman expressed his 
admiration “for the resolute struggle of the Turkish nation to go forward under the 
indomitable leadership of...Kemal Atatürk.” Next, touching on the convergence of 
the two countries and the importance of democracy, Truman said that “we are still 
happier that the decision of the Turkish nation to continue the development of 
democratic institutions and to further safeguard human rights and liberties is being 
carried out at a time when these ideals-so dear to all Americans-are being ruthlessly 
crushed and obliterated in many parts of the world.”64 It was the first time that 
Truman personally took the opportunity to convey the message of democracy to 
Turkey. Others would follow. 
Turkey’s identity as a Moslem country normally did not receive significant 
attention by the U.S. However, American policy-makers sometimes surmised that 
improving relations with Turkey can also positively affect their standing with other 
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Moslem countries. In a memorandum sent to the State Department’s Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs, Charles Reed of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs maintained 
that the U.S. “might find it advantageous to back Turkey, an important figure in the 
Islamic world, for one of the non-permanent seats on the Security Council.”65 
By 1949, Turkey was also being commended by old friends. Sir Hughe 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Britain’s ambassador to Ankara during the war, wrote for the 
News of the World on October 9, 1949. Hugessen avowed that even though Turkey 
needed a period of tutorship at the initial stages of its political development, “in the 
last four years, the movement towards full political freedom has received a great and 
not altogether expected impetus.” Hugessen likened Turkey to an adolescent who 
just recently “proclaimed himself of age.” In addition, Hugessen warned Turkey that 
“though Russia has not asserted her claims since 1947, she might always renew 
them.”66 
Other observers also liked what they saw. Following his visit to Greece and 
Turkey, Professor Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago wrote to Dean 
Acheson that he “was impressed by the high morale among both the Turks and the 
Greeks” and that U.S. “policy has been a very real success in building democracy, 
restoring morale and increasing the capacity of these countries to defend and support 
themselves.”67 
Another important event in the history of Turkish democracy was the 
abolition of the Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri) in 1949. These 
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tribunals were the legacy of the War of Liberation. As the extraordinary measure of 
extraordinary times, they tried deserters and traitors. What made them remarkable 
was that the cases were tried by members of the TGNA. Moreover, their verdicts 
were not subject to appeal and sentences, including executions, were swiftly 
enforced. These tribunals remained inactive after the War of Liberation, except 
briefly during the insurgency in southeast Turkey in 1925. Irksome of the 
opposition’s hardening tone, Recep Peker threatened DP members in early-1949 that 
the tribunals were still in existence. Inadvertently, Peker’s threat brought about the 
tribunals’ dissolution. The embassy’s Turkish adviser, Ali Nur Bozcalı, was quoted 
by Perkins that the tribunals “have rendered considerable services during the period 
of the War of Independence, in suppressing treason, public disorder and desertion, 
and under the Republic, in the matter of checking reactionary movements.”68 
Nevertheless, they were incompatible with democratic norms and were therefore 
abolished. 
Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak’s speech of December 12, 1949, on the 
occasion of Turkey’s adherence to the Statute of the Council of Europe, is also 
noteworthy. It is another signal of the connection between Turkish democratization 
and its post-war convergence with the West. Sadak addressed the assembly and 
reportedly “stressed the importance of the step about to be taken as a recognition of 
the fact that Turkey’s foreign and economic policies tie it to the Western world rather 
than to the Middle East.” “Anatolia,” exclaimed Sadak, has now “entered into the 
political and economic frontiers of the European Union.” 
Similar to President Truman’s Voice of America speech the previous year, 
Assistant Secretary of State George Allen addressed the Turkish-American Society 
                                                 
68 Perkins to the Secretary of State, dispatch no. 158, “Abolition of the Turkish Tribunals of 
 65 
in New York on October 28, 1949, a day before Turkey’s Republic Day. Allen also 
chose to praise the gains of the Turkish Revolution by contrasting it with its 
counterpart to the north: “It has always been a source of amazement to me that two 
nearly simultaneous revolutions in two neighboring territories, the Russian Empire 
and the Ottoman Empire, should have had such opposite results. In Russia, 
revolution brought the extinction of freedom. In Turkey, it resulted in a great 
increase of freedom.”69 Allen speech demonstrated once again how democratic 
sympathies merged with anti-Communism in the U.S.’s position vis-a-vis Turkey. 
The U.S. celebrated the DP’s electoral victory on May 14, 1950. The DP won 
the general elections and ousted the RPP government. The State Department viewed 
it a “victory for democracy.” İnönü’s role in this victory was not forgotten: 
The part that President İnönü has played in guiding his countrymen 
to democratic government in an atmosphere of freedom and calm has 
earned him the respect of the democratic peoples of the world. The 
United States is confident that the new Government in Turkey will 
carry on the democratic tradition developed during his 
administration.70 
 
In his letter of May 24, President Truman congratulated Celal Bayar on his 
election as President by the TGNA as follows: 
That the Turkish people, through their newly elected representatives 
in the National Assembly, have bestowed upon you this highest of 
honors is indeed recognition of the significant role that you have 
long played in furthering the cause of democratic development in 
your country. Turkey has shown the world yet another evidence not 
only of its attachment to this cause, but of its inner strength and 
fundamental stability which has won it such a respected place within 
the family of democratic nations.71 
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In more private considerations, Truman was less modest. In his diary entry of May 
15, 1952, he exclaimed that “we saved Greece and Turkey.”72 Several years later, he 
would write to a friend that he had “kept Stalin out of Greece and Turkey.”73 
4.3 Conclusion 
On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. It became the first military 
conflict of the Cold War. The Turkish government quickly decided to show its 
friendship with the U.S. by sending troops. Just like in May, American policy-
makers were jubilant, this time joined by public opinion. Assistant Secretary of State 
George McGhee called June 25, together with May 14, a day “which will long be 
remembered in Turkey, just as it will be remembered in the United States and in 
other countries of the free world.”74 WCR Radio of New York City called Turkey’s 
offer “meaningful” as it was “sitting in front of the Soviet barrel.”75 Estelle M. 
Sternberger of WLIB Radio reportedly suggested that Turkey’s enthusiasm, together 
with the fact that it was “ruled by a democratic government,” unlike its Arab 
neighbors, should translate into a non-permanent membership in the UN Security 
Council.76 
Notwithstanding Americans’ enthusiasm, it was primarily President İnönü 
and Turkey’s Kemalist legacy that deserved credit for the transition to democracy. 
One can look at other undemocratic states in Europe and the Middle East that the 
U.S. supported at the onset of the Cold War. The U.S. consented to Portugal’s 
founding membership of NATO in 1949. Portugal was as undemocratic as Turkey, 
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even more so at the time. Spain engaged in bilateral relations with the U.S. in the 
post-World War II era and Franco still retained his dictatorial regime. Iran was just 
another case. Thus, it is safe to assume that given Turkey’s eagerness to become 
democratic, the U.S. was pleased but also worried with its “experiment.” However, it 
is questionable whether the U.S. would have pushed Turkey to the point of losing it 
to the Soviet Union. The record suggests that primary U.S. interest in Turkey’s 
internal politics was stability, not democratization. To be sure, Turkey’s post-1923 
political regime was an advantage in its dealings with the U.S. after the war. Overall, 
the American alliance eased but did not bring about Turkish democracy. 
Turkish transition to democracy was neither a fully endogenous nor an 
exogenous affair. This chapter placed Turkey’s transition to democracy in the 
context of Turkish-American relations from March 1947 until May 1950. It was 
argued that different than the 1945-47 period, the U.S. had a genuine interest in 
Turkish democracy and constantly referred to it. With President Truman declaring 
his doctrine and the Cold War, it is understandable that Turkey was presented in such 
a positive manner. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION:  
BRINGING THEM TOGETHER 
 
The relationship between Turkish democracy and Turkish-American relations 
from 1945 until 1950 is an interesting one. In contrast to Germany and Japan, where 
it led the transition to democracy, the U.S. acted as a complementary player in the 
Turkish case. The U.S. did not interfere with Turkish affairs, but showed an interest 
in its aim to democratize. 
To be sure, that interest was predominated by strategic concerns. Primary 
U.S. interest in Turkey was geostrategy. As soon as World War II ended, the U.S. 
devised means to “contain” the Soviet Union. Turkey constituted “the stopper in the 
neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most 
effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.”1 Indeed, until the 
Truman Doctrine, American interest in Turkish democracy was modest. Democracy 
was hardly mentioned when American policy-makers discussed Turkey while Greece 
was constantly praised for its democratic character. 
The Truman Doctrine not only announced the Cold War, it also marked the 
change in U.S. attitudes towards Turkish democracy. Even though Turkey held 
comparatively free elections in 1946, it was only after the Truman Doctrine that its 
democratic character received American attention. 
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Students of Turkish-American relations and Turkish democracy have not 
shown interest in the connection between the two. The primary U.S. concern at the 
onset of the Cold War was to keep the Soviet Union out of Turkey, an indispensable 
asset in American strategic calculations.2 Meanwhile, Turkish leaders’ democratic 
credentials, particularly those of Atatürk and İnönü, were the triggering factors for 
democratization. The Turkish revolution, pushed through Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s 
reforms from 1923 until 1938 and carried on by his friend and successor İsmet İnönü, 
was the main reason for democratization.  
This thesis argued that the U.S. was genuinely interested in Turkey’s 
democratization, but did not exert pressure on Turkey to that end. Turkey was 
moving in that direction since 1923. In Karpat’s words, “the transition of Turkey’s 
one-party regime to a multi-party system was prepared...by the liberal concepts at the 
foundation of the Republic.” The actual transition came through “the decision of the 
Republican Party government under the direct influence of İnönü.”3 
In the first chapter of the thesis, it was argued that there was a need to 
reevaluate the relationship between Turkish-American relations and Turkish 
democracy. In the second chapter, the thesis reconsidered Kemalism’s relation to 
democracy. The two schools of thought on Kemalism and Turkey’s republican 
experience were analyzed. It was argued that the first group looked at Kemalism as 
an authoritarian regime. In leading scholar Feroz Ahmad’s words, the Turkish system 
after 1923 was based on a loose “alliance between the urban middle class and the 
intelligentsia, army officials, state officials, the landowners, and notables of 
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Anatolia.”4 Elections were held in the country periodically, but only RPP candidates 
were allowed to run. The people never elected their representatives directly, but only 
the electoral colleges that decided the result. This second group argued that Kemalist 
ideology essentially aimed at building democracy in the country. Kemal Karpat 
asserts that “the transition of Turkey’s one-party regime to a multi-party system was 
prepared...by the liberal concepts at the foundation of the Republic,” which finally 
became a reality through “the decision of the Republican Party government under the 
direct influence of İnönü.”5 The thesis sided with the second group’s position that 
Kemalism was intrinsically democratic. 
The second chapter also looked at the historiography on Turkish-American 
relations and U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. It was held that primary U.S. 
interest in Turkey during the Cold War was geostrategy. The U.S. was eager to 
thwart perceived Soviet expansion into the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. 
That was why the U.S. improved its relations with Turkey.  
Finally, the second chapter looked at previous attempts to link Turkish 
democratization from 1945 until 1950 and Turkish-American relations. Both Paul 
Henze’s thesis that Turkish democratization did not receive any interest by American 
policy-makers and Hakan Yılmaz’s assertion that Turkish policy-makers used 
democratization to secure their entry into the “Western club” were challenged. The 
thesis argued that the actual connection between Turkish democratization and 
Turkish-American relations was not one of cause and effect. Yet, the U.S. was aware 
of Turkish democratization and did not pressure Turkey. For their part, Turkish 
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leaders perceived democracy as the zenith of their Westernization and another step to 
honor Atatürk’s legacy. 
In the third chapter, the thesis looked at the parallel evolution of Turkish 
democratization and Turkish-American relations from 1945 until 1947. Especially 
during this period, Turkish democratization only received modest attention by the 
U.S. That changed with the Truman Doctrine in 1947. 
The fourth chapter looked at how Turkish democratization came to the 
forefront in American policy-makers’ considerations. With the Truman Doctrine, the 
U.S. began to formulate its foreign policy in line with anti-Communism. In Turkey’s 
case, efforts to democratize were hailed as how successful the U.S. was. 
To be sure, U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was not that 
“successful.” Writing at the time, American theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had doubts 
about the idealism of U.S. foreign policy: 
Communists use power without scruple because they are under the 
illusion that their conception of an unambiguously ideal end justifies 
such use. Our own culture is schizophrenic upon the subject of 
power...Sometimes it verges on that curious combination of cynicism 
and idealism which characterizes communism, and is prepared to use 
any means without scruple to achieve its desired end.6  
 
Democracy fell apart under a military coup in Turkey in 1960. The U.S. kept 
working with the military government. Even though a retransition to democracy 
would come about, it would break down twice more in 1971 and 1980. In these 
instances, the U.S. maintained its relations with Turkey. Elsewhere in the world, it 
would support regimes even more undemocratic than Turkey’s military-backed 
governments. 
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To be fair, the period from 1945 until 1950 marked a shining episode in 
Turkish-American relations and Turkish democracy. It must be conceded that the 
U.S. was, after all, an “empire by invitation.” The decision of Turkish policy-makers 
to diverge from the Soviet Union and align with the U.S. yielded a favorable result. 
In this instance, U.S. foreign policy perhaps worked. 
Convergence with the U.S. also resonated with Turkey’s determination to 
modernize and Westernize. Turkish statesmen and intellectuals saw democracy and 
the U.S. partnership as the modernization of their country. “Western democracy” 
became a catchword in the second half of the 1940s. The Turkish transition to 
democracy occurred while the Cold War was in motion. 
American mistrust of the Soviet Union and Stalin’s imprudent foreign policy 
after the war came as a blessing in disguise for Turkey. Turkey’s convergence with 
the U.S. enabled its accession to NATO in 1952. Its democracy was obviously a 
complementary factor. Following the Truman Doctrine, Turkish democracy was 
progressively hailed by American policy-makers. Along with its involvement in the 
Korean War, Turkey not only became a strategic asset, but also a prized symbol as to 
how “victorious” U.S. foreign policy could be in “containing” the Soviets.  
The episode studied in this thesis is not only relevant to the history of the 
Cold War. “Westernization” and “modernization” are themes emphasized by Turks 
even today. Following the European Union summit of October 2004, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called his country’s EU bid a “struggle of civilization” 
(medeniyet mücadelesi). Just as the institution of a “Western” type of democracy and 
alignment with the U.S.-led Western world seemed like the only option for Turkish 
policy-makers sixty years ago, Kemal Derviş, head of the United Nations 
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Development Program and formerly a cabinet minister, called Turkey’s full 
membership in the EU “the only possible option.”7 
 
                                                 
7 “Derviş: Türkiye’nin ve AB’nin Tek Şansı ‘Tam Üyelik’” (Derviş: ‘Full Membership’ Only Option 
for Turkey and EU), Hürriyet, May 20, 2005, 9. 
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